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FROM ROME TO LISBON: “EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM” IN THE (NEW) 
EUROPEAN UNION
ROBERT SCHÜTZE*
1. Introduction
Is the European Union a legislative giant on clay feet? Is it true that “the EU 
has (with some specific exceptions) no original competence to implement EU 
law”?1 This question is hardly ever raised in the European law literature.2 Two 
federal designs for the distribution of “executive” powers exist,3 which – empir-
ically – correspond to two constitutional orders. According to American fed-
eralism, the Union’s legislative and executive powers are co-extensive and the 
Union establishes its own executive infrastructure to enforce Union law. By 
contrast, German federalism insists that the Union’s executive competences 
are smaller than its legislative competences. The Union must therefore exten-
sively rely on the Member States to administer federal law. 
 In the history of European integration, both federal designs emerged. The 
first was developed in the context of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
* Durham Law School.
1. Dann, “European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a parliament in 
a semi-parliamentary democracy”, 9 ELJ (2009), 549, at 552. For a similar view, see also 
Schmidt-Aßmann, “Einleitung: Der Europäische Verwaltungsbund und die Rolle des Euro-
päischen Verwaltungsrechts” in Schmidt-Aßmann and Schöndorf-Haubold (Eds.), Der Euro-
päische Verwaltungsverbund (Mohr Siebeck, 2005), p. 1, at p. 2: “die Gemeinschaft selbst 
verfügt nur über wenige eigene Verwaltungskompetenzen”.
2. The interest in the constitutional foundations of European administrative law has signiﬁ-
cantly increased in the last decade. For general overviews of EU administrative law, see Klepper, 
Vollzugskompetenzen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft aus abgeleitetem Recht: Zulässigkeit – 
Modalitäten – Rechtsfolgen (Nomos, 2001); Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP, 2006); 
Schwarze, European Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006); Chiti and Greco (Eds.), 
Trattato di diritto amministrativo Europeo (Giuffrè, 2007); Auby and Dutheil de la Rochère 
(Eds.), Droit Administratif Européen (Bruylant, 2007); von Danwitz, Europäisches Verwaltung-
srecht (Springer, 2008); Dutheil de la Rochère (Ed.), L’Execution du Droit de l’Union: Entre 
Mécanismes Communautaires et Droits Nationaux (Bruylant, 2009); and Curtin, Executive 
Power in the European Union (OUP, 2009). 
3. The notion of executive power typically embraces a “regulatory” and an “applicatory” 
dimension. The former is the power to “implement” abstract norms through secondary regula-
tion; while the latter stands for the power to apply norms in individual situations. The following 
article analyses the Union’s executive power sensu stricto. It investigates the powers of the 
Union to itself apply European norms to individual situations.
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which opted for the “American solution”. But this constitutional architecture 
was not originally chosen for the European (Economic) Community. The Rome 
Treaty expressly granted the power to adopt decision in very few areas; and 
therefore it seemed to follow the “German solution”. Was the Community thus 
constitutionally condemned to rely on the Member States to execute its law? 
And which of these two models has the Lisbon Treaty chosen for the European 
Union? What are the limits to the Union’s executive powers; and what is their 
nature? 
 This article analyses the federal constitutional principles governing the 
executive branch of the European Union. It hopes to show that the Union has 
taken a path that combines the American and German federal solutions. That 
is: the Union’s executive powers are co-extensive with its legislative powers; 
yet, the Union’s executive powers are only subsidiary to the Member States’ 
powers. In order to prove this thesis, we shall briefly look at the American and 
German solutions for the execution of federal law (section 2), before investi-
gating the scope and nature of the European Union’s executive powers (section 
3). The constitutional principles governing the Union’s species of “executive 
federalism” will be analysed in section 4.4 Here, we shall examine the federal 
restrictions imposed on the (relative) administrative autonomy of the Member 
States and highlight the constitutional limits imposed on the Union’s own 
executive powers. This section will also briefly engage with the phenomenon 
of “mixed administration” in the Union legal order. A conclusion will  synthesize 
4. The concept of “executive federalism” is ambivalent and has been deﬁned in – at least – 
three ways. A ﬁrst deﬁnition simply identiﬁes “executive federalism” with the decentralized 
execution of federal law by the Member States according to a constitutional regime established 
by the Union (cf. Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2005), p. 607). A second deﬁnition has extended this idea to the existence of important 
“political” choices that the implementation of federal legislation leaves to State governments (cf. 
Frowein, “Integration and the Federal Experience in Germany and Switzerland” in Cappelletti, 
Seccombe and Weiler (Eds.), Integration Through Law – European and the American Federal 
Experience, Vol. I Book 1 (De Gruyter, 1986), p. 573, at pp. 586–587: “If one takes into account 
the important decisions which need to be taken at the level of execution, it becomes clear that 
this competence of the Länder is far from negligible. The notion of ‘Vollzugsföderalismus’ (fed-
eralism in the execution of laws, etc.) describes this important phenomenon.”) The problem with 
this deﬁnition is that it no longer corresponds to German constitutional reality (cf. Köttgen, “Der 
Einﬂuß des Bundes auf die deutsche Verwaltung und die Organisation der bundeseigenen Ver-
waltung”, 11 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts (1962), 173, at 187: “[D]as steigende Gewicht 
der allgemeinen Verwatlungsvorschriften der Bundesregierung in Verbindung mit den verschie-
denen Varianten eines Weisungsrechts [hat] eine “politische Enteignung” der Länder zur Folge 
gehabt.”); and should, in any event, be better identiﬁed with “cooperative federalism”. A third 
deﬁnition of “executive federalism” associates the decentralized application of federal law with 
the composition of the second chamber of the federal legislature as well as a consensual deci-
sion-making mode (cf. Dann, op. cit. supra note 1). The following article chooses the ﬁrst 
(restrictive) deﬁnition. 
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the various findings and evaluate the Lisbon Treaty’s reform of the constitu-
tional foundations of Union executive power.
2. Federalism and the executive function: Centralized and 
decentralized enforcement 
The federal idea stands for duplex regimen: the duplication of governmental 
functions. This dualism typically extends to all three branches of government. 
Federal Unions will not only have two legislative branches; they will equally 
duplicate the executive (and judicial) branch.5 However, the scope of the fed-
eral executive may differ – depending on whether the Union prefers the cen-
tralized or decentralized enforcement of federal law. According to the 
“centralization model”, the execution of federal law is principally left to federal 
administrative authorities. In order to enforce its law, the Union establishes its 
own independent administrative infrastructure. By contrast, the “decentraliza-
tion model” leaves the execution of federal law principally to the Member 
States of the Union. The Union’s executive competences are thus smaller than 
its legislative competences. 
 The following section investigates the two models by looking at the consti-
tutional experiences of the United States of America and the Federal Republic 
of Germany.
2.1. Executive centralization: The United States of America 
American federalism considers the Union’s executive powers to be co-exten-
sive with its legislative powers. The 1787 Constitution expressly provided the 
legislature with the power “to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States”;6 and vested the 
“ executive” power in the American President.7 The legislative and executive 
spheres of the Union thus coincide. Federal executive competences are not 
exclusive competences. The States can autonomously execute federal law; and 
5. The article will not deal with the judicial – federal – relations between a Union and its 
Member States. For a comparison between American and European judicial federalism, see Hal-
berstam, “Gerichtliche Zusammenarbeit im föderalen System der USA: Ein rechtsvergleichen-
der Beitrag zur Diskussion über die Gerichtsreform in der Europäischen Union”, 66 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (2002), 216. 
6. Art. I, Section 8 – Clause 18 U.S. Constitution.
7. “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America” (Art. 
II, Section 1, Clause 1 U.S. Constitution). According to Art. II, Section 3, Clause 4 the President 
must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”. 
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the Union is allowed to “motivate” the States to implement federal standards.8 
However, any decentralized administration must be entirely voluntary. In the 
executive sphere, the constitutional core of American federalism is the “non-
commandeering” principle: the Union cannot “commandeer” the States to 
execute federal law. And because it cannot oblige the States to enforce its law, 
the Union has to use its own executive powers. These powers have, in the past, 
been extensively exercised to establish the Union’s own administrative 
infrastructure.
 The principle that the Union cannot “commandeer” the States to enforce 
federal laws was clarified in New York v. United States.9 In creating the 1787 
Union, “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress 
the power to regulate individuals, not States”. Thus “even where Congress has 
the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting cer-
tain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit 
those acts”. What was the principle behind this constitutional prohibition? 
“[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state 
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal offi-
cials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the elec-
toral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished[.]”10 But 
more importantly: “States are not mere political subdivisions of the United 
States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agen-
cies of the Federal Government.” Having retained a “residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty”, the Union cannot “compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program”.11 While federal legislation is supreme over State 
legislation,12 the States – as corporate entities – are not “subordinate” to the 
Union.13 
8. This has been clariﬁed in Supreme Court jurisprudence, cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203 (1987) at 206: “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds”. The 
Union can also “encourage” the States to regulate an activity themselves out of fear that federal 
standards will otherwise pre-empt State legislation (cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. 
Assn., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)). 
9. New York v. United States et al., 505 U.S. 144 (1993). This claim is not uncontested (cf. 
Caminker, “State Sovereignty and subordinancy: May Congress commandeer State ofﬁcers to 
implement federal law?”, 95 Columbia Law Review (1995), 1001, at 1059: “The Court’s formal-
istic claim in New York that State sovereignty entails legislative and executive freedom from 
federal coercion is thus fundamentally misconceived”). For a softer claim arguing that an origi-
nal understanding of the U.S. Constitution supports the prohibition to commandeer the State 
legislatures, but not State executives, see Prakash, “Field ofﬁce federalism”, (1993) Virginia 
Law Review, 1957, at 1961: “The Founding Generation, then, distinguished commandeering 
State legislatures from commandeering the magistry (executives and judicial ofﬁcers).” 
10. New York v. United States et al., cited supra note 9, paras. 166 and 169.
11. Ibid., para 188 (with reference to the Federalist No. 39).
12. See Art. VI, Clause 2 (“Supremacy Clause”).
13. According to Caminker (op. cit. supra note 9), this formal understanding of the States as 
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 This “non-commandeering” principle was specifically confirmed in relation 
to executive power senso strictu in Printz v. United States.14 Federal legislation 
tried to force State officers to apply federal law. The Supreme Court categor-
ically rejected this form of involuntary decentralized enforcement. The Con-
stitution established a system of “dual sovereignty”, according to which the 
States retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty”.15 “It is an essential 
attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and 
autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.” And it was not compat-
ible with this independence “that their officers be ‘dragooned’ into administer-
ing federal law”. The ability of the Union “to direct the functioning of the state 
executive” would “compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty”.16 
The very idea of dual sovereignty required the organizational independence 
of the Union and the States.17 The States could not be reduced to mere “agents” 
of the Union; and this meant that the Union was not entitled to oblige the States 
either to legislate or execute in pursuance of federal law.
2.2. Executive decentralization: The Federal Republic of Germany 
The “decentralization model” entrusts the execution of federal law principally 
to the Member States. This idea has become known as “executive federalism” 
(Vollzugsföderalismus). It characterizes German (and Swiss) federalism.18
 The central pillar of Germany’s executive federalism is Article 83 of the 
German Constitution (GC): “The States shall execute federal laws in their 
own right unless this Constitution does provide or permit otherwise.” While 
there are indeed constitutional exceptions,19 the decentralized enforcement of 
federal law thus represents the constitutional rule. The German Constitution 
 distinguishes between two regimes of decentralized execution, which differ as 
institutionally autonomous entities is “quite new” (ibid., 1015): “Until quite recently, the 
Supreme Court attempted to secure its view of the proper allocation of power between the two 
governmental systems through efforts to circumscribe the substantive content of enumerated 
federal power.” 
14. Printz, Sheriff/Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
15. Ibid., paras. 918–919 (with reference to the Federalist No. 39).
16. Ibid., paras. 928 and 932.
17. This institutional understanding of “dual sovereignty” contrasts with a substantive read-
ing of “dual sovereignty”. The latter has become known as dual federalism and is based on the 
existence of two mutually exclusive spheres of legislative competences (cf. Schütze, From Dual 
to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP, 2009), esp. Ch. 2). 
18. Cf. Frowein, op. cit. supra note 4; and Dubey, “Administration indirecte et féderalisme 
d’exécution en Europe”, 38 CDE (2003), 87. 
19. Cf. Art. 86 German Constitution. Fields of direct federal execution are enumerated in the 
Constitution. Art. 87 GC mentions, inter alia, the “foreign service”, the “federal ﬁnancial admin-
istration”, and the “administration of federal waterways and shipping”. 
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to the degree of federal control over State administrations. The ordinary regime 
is set out in Article 84 GC. The States here execute federal law “in their own 
right”. The States are thereby “not only entitled but also obliged to implement 
federal law as their own executive responsibility”.20 A special regime for the 
decentralized execution of federal law is established in Article 85 GC. The 
States are here acting on “federal commission”.21 
 What are the constitutional principles governing the State enforcement of 
federal law? Article 84 GC tells us that “[w]here the States execute federal law 
as their own affair, they shall provide for the establishment of the requisite 
authorities and regulate their administrative procedures.”22 Yet, the federal 
government is entitled to adopt “general administrative rules”;23 and in excep-
tional circumstances, the Union may even “issue instructions in particular 
cases”.24 These control mechanisms are even reinforced under Article 85 GC. 
The Union may establish State administrative organs to ensure an efficient 
execution of federal law,25 and it is entitled to co-decide on the appointment 
of top State administrative officials.26 It even enjoys a general right to issue 
“instructions” to State administrative organs.27 
20. BVerfGE 55, 274 (Berufsausbildungsabgabe), 317 (translation – RS): “The States have, 
to the extent that the Constitution does not state or permit otherwise, the comprehensive execu-
tive competence. It follows that they are not only entitled but also obliged to implement federal 
law as their own executive responsibility.” 
21. This special regime of decentralized execution applies whenever the Constitution so 
requires; or, where the Constitution entitles the federation to establish it on the basis of a federal 
law. For the former scenario, see Art. 90(2) GC (emphasis added): “The States, or such self-
governing corporate bodies as are competent under State law, shall administer the federal motor-
ways and other federal highways used by long-distance trafﬁc on federal commission.”
22. Art. 84(1) German Constitution. 
23. Ibid., Art. 84(2).
24. Ibid., Art. 84(5): “With a view to the execution of federal laws, the Federal Government 
may be authorized by a federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat to issue instructions 
in particular cases. They shall be addressed to the highest Land authorities unless the Federal 
Government considers the matter urgent.” The federal instruction is here an internal administra-
tive command that has no external effect on third parties. While the instruction must – as a mat-
ter of principle – be addressed to the highest State (administrative) organs; in urgent situations, 
the federal command may even address the lower administrative echelons. The idea that the fed-
eral command should – in principle – be directed to the highest State administrative organs is 
designed to protect, to some extent, the administrative autonomy of the States. For examples of 
individual commands to State administrations, see Blümel, “Verwalltungszuständigkeit” in Isen-
see and Kirchhof (Eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Band IV 
(C.F. Müller, 1990), p. 876. 
25. Art. 85(1) German Constitution.
26. Ibid., Art. 85(2).
27. Ibid., Art. 85(3): “The Land authorities shall be subject to instructions from the compe-
tent highest federal authorities. Such instructions shall be addressed to the highest Land authori-
ties unless the Federal Government considers the matter urgent. Implementation of the 
instructions shall be ensured by the highest Land authorities.” 
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 How are we to characterize this German species of executive federalism? 
The German Constitutional Court has insisted on an “essentially uniform 
administrative practice” within the Union. “The uniform validity of legal norms 
within the federal territory would be made illusory, where their decentralized 
execution through the states leads to significant differences.”28 The German 
federation has indeed extensively used its competences to adopt general admin-
istrative rules. Yet, the Union’s power to issue instruction to State administra-
tions undermines their administrative autonomy much more fundamentally, 
because the federal “command” here pierces the “sovereignty veil” of the 
States. And since federal instructions are not addressed to the States as corpo-
rate entities but to the State administrative organs as such,29 German executive 
federalism is characterized by two elements: hierarchical subordination and 
institutional integration. The federal power to “command” State administra-
tions subordinates and integrates the latter into the federal administration.30  
The decentralized execution of federal law in Germany shows therefore strong 
elements of a “mixed administration” – despite an orthodox denial still cher-
ished by German constitutionalism.31 This form of “integrated administration” 
is particularly evident where the State administrations act “on federal 
commission”.32 The – strong – unitary elements in the institutional dimension 
of German executive federalism correspond to the unitary nature of its 
28. BVerfGE 11, 6 (Dampfkessel), 17 (emphasis added).
29. This was not (yet) the case under the 1871 Imperial Constitution. The Union was not 
allowed to command any organ or ofﬁcer of the State administrations directly. Cf. Hänel, Deut-
sches Staatsrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 1892), p. 208 (translation – RS): “The States face the 
Empire as closed units.” 
30. Blümel (op. cit. supra note 24, at p. 898 (translation – RS)): “Insofar, there exists not 
only a real hierarchical relation (superordination and subordination) between the federal and 
State authorities; the latter are in fact integrated into a unitary administrative structure.”
31. Orthodox German constitutionalism insists on the “separation of administrative spheres” 
between the Union and the States and thus generally afﬁrms a “prohibition of mixed administra-
tion”. The German Constitutional Court has long tried to overcome this theoretical orthodoxy in 
BVerfGE 63, 1 (Schornsteinfegerversorgung), at 39–40 (emphasis added, translation – RS): 
“There is no general constitutional principle according to which executive competences must be 
exclusively exercised by the Union or the States unless the Constitution expressly provides 
 otherwise. Such a general principle cannot be derived from the general structure of the Consti-
tution.” However, more recent jurisprudence has revived this idea, see BVerfGE 108, 169 
(Telekom munikationsgesetz), 182.
32. The State execution of federal law “on federal commission” has been characterized as 
“between” State and federal administration, cf. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland – Band 2 (Beck, 1980), p. 808: “ein ‘Mittelding’ zwischen landeseigener und bun-
deseigener Verwaltung.”; as well as: Trute, “Artikel 85” in von Mangoldt, Klein and Starck 
(Eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz – Band 3 (Vahlen, 2005), p. 72: “Zwischenform zwischen 
Landeseigenverwaltung und Bundesverwaltung”. 
1392  Schütze CML Rev. 2010
 functional dimension. For decisions of State administrations will be valid 
throughout the territory of the Union.33
3. The constitutional foundations of executive power: From Rome to 
Lisbon 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) “was essentially an admin-
istrative organization”.34 The ECSC Treaty had established a “High Authority”, 
which was – principally – to apply the ECSC Treaty in individual situations. 
The general instrument within the ECSC was the “decision”.35 This instrument 
allowed the Community to adopt general rules as well as individual decisions.36 
The Community’s “legislative” and “executive” spheres did here coincide; and 
in this point the ECSC followed the American centralized solution. 
 In contrast to the “administrative system” established by the ECSC, the 
European (Economic) Community was conceived as a legislative system.37 
When the European Econo mic Community was founded, the 1957 Rome Treaty 
distinguished general applicable “regulations” from individually applicable 
“decisions” and specified – for the majority of legal bases – the exact instru-
ment that could be used to intervene into the common market.38 The vast 
majority of EC competences were “regulatory” or “legislative” competences. 
33. BVerfGE 11, 6 (Dampfkessel), 18 (translation – RS): “The executive sovereignty of a 
State is principally conﬁned to its territory. However, it is an essential characteristic of the State 
execution of federal laws that the state administrative act that implements federal law will enjoy 
validity in the entire federal territory.”
34. Chiti, “Forms of European administrative action”, 68 Law & Contemporary Problems 
(2004-5), 37, at 38.
35. Art. 14 ECSC stated: “(1) In order to carry out the tasks assigned to it the High Authority 
shall, in accordance with the provisions in the Treaty, take decisions, make recommendations or 
deliver opinions. (2) Decisions shall be binding in their entirety. (3) Recommendations shall be 
binding as to the aims to be pursued but shall leave the choice of the appropriate methods for 
achieving these aims to those to whom the recommendations are addressed.” 
36. Art. 15(2) ECSC distinguished between individual and general decisions.
37. Azoulai, “Pour un droit de l’execution de l’Union Européenne” in Dutheil de la Rochère, 
op. cit. supra note 2, p. 1, at p. 2
38. Grabitz, “The sources of Community law: Acts of the Community institutions” in EC 
Commission (Ed.), Thirty Years of Community Law (EC Commission, 1981), p. 81, at p. 88: “As 
a rule, the Treaties establishing the European Communities leave the Community institutions 
with no choice as regards the legal form which their acts take; on the contrary, for each enabling 
rule they prescribe the form in which the required provisions must appear.” The European Com-
munity thus did not follow the ECSC “principle of minimum intervention”. For a discussion of 
this principle, see Schütze, “The morphology of legislative power in the European Community: 
Legal instruments and the federal division of powers”, 25 YEL (2006), 91, at 145.
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Community executive power sensu stricto was attributed in – very – few areas.39 
The European Community thus appeared to follow the German federal solution 
of executive decentralization.
 Would this theoretical solution be confirmed by constitutional practice? 
What exactly was the scope and nature of European executive powers? Were 
there general or implied executive powers? Let us look at these questions by 
analysing the – ambivalent – constitutional foundations of European executive 
power under the Rome Treaty (3.1.). It is only against this historical back-
ground that we can evaluate the textual reforms introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty (3.2.).
3.1. The “European Community”: Ambivalent foundations of executive   
 power 
The “absence of a clear constitutional basis for public administration”40 under 
the Rome Treaty was particularly pronounced as regards the vertical division 
of executive power. What was the Community’s executive sphere? Beyond the 
few express executive powers, were there general executive competences of 
the Community? Four potential provisions were ambivalent candidates.
 Within the institutional powers, Article 202 EC called on the Council to 
“ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained”. To achieve this, 
the Council would “have the power to take decisions”. Was this a general power 
to take decisions? The wording of Article 202 EC tilted against such a view 
for it required the Council to take decisions “in accordance with the provisions 
of this Treaty”. This was a constitutional clarification that this clause was no 
executive competence reservoir. The third indent of Article 202 EC then 
obliged the Council to “confer on the Commission, in the acts which the 
 Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council 
lays down”. The provision was – again – not a legal competence.41 It allowed 
for the delegation of executive power from one Community institution to 
another; and what the Council did not have, the Commission could not receive. 
39. The 1957 Rome Treaty only expressly mentions the power to adopt “decisions” addressed 
to individuals in three areas: agriculture (Art. 43 EEC), transport (Arts. 79 and 80 EEC) and 
competition (Arts. 85 et seq. EEC). The power to adopt decisions under the common commercial 
policy was implicit in Art. 113(2) EEC.
40. Chiti, op. cit. supra note 34, 37 at 42.
41. This followed from its place within the Treaty, which dealt with inter-institutional rela-
tionships (cf. Möllers, “Durchführung des Gemeinschaftsrechts: Vertragliche Dogmatik und 
theoretische Implikationen”, (2002) EuR, 483, at 498). It is conﬁrmed by Case C-257/01, Com-
mission v. Council, [2005] ECR I-345, para 66: “The provision does not concern the division of 
powers between the Community and the Member States.”
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 The second promising provision for a general executive power of the Com-
munity was Article 211 EC. The Article dealt with the powers of the Commis-
sion. The Commission was to “ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and 
the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied”. It would 
thereby enjoy “its own power of decision”; yet – again – this power was 
restricted to “the manner provided for in this Treaty”. The competence to 
execute European law would therefore have to be granted elsewhere in the 
Treaty.42 
 What about the general powers of the Community? Following the Single 
European Act, Article 95 EC allowed the Community to adopt “measures for 
the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action in Member States”. The power to adopt “measures” appeared to 
include the power to adopt decisions. But how could a decision “harmonize” 
national law or administrative action? Would Article 95 EC entitle the Com-
munity to go beyond “general administrative rules”?43 In Germany v. Council,44 
this argument was placed on the judicial table in the context of the Product 
Safety Directive.45 Germany argued that the power to “harmonize” precluded 
the executive power to adopt decisions;46 and since Article 9 of the relevant 
Directive granted such a power in certain situations, the provision had to be 
void.47 The Court held otherwise:
42. For a different view, see Biaggini, Theorie und Praxis des Verwaltungsrechts im Bun-
desstaat (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1996), p. 77, arguing in favour of a (limited) autonomous 
executive competence of the Commission under Arts. 202 and 211 EC. However, this view is 
hard to reconcile with Case C-303/90, France v. Commission, [1991] ECR I-5315, para 30.
43. For this excellent question, see Klepper, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 72–73.
44. Case C-359/92, Germany v. Council, [1994] ECR I-3681.
45. Directive 92/59/EEC on general product safety (O.J. 1992, L 228/24). The Directive is 
now replaced by: Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety (O.J. 2002, L 11/4).
46. Germany’s principal argument in this respect is quoted in para 17: “The German Govern-
ment objects to that argument essentially on the ground that the sole aim of Article [94] et seq. 
of the [EC] Treaty, and of Article [95 (1) EC] in particular, is the approximation of laws and that 
those articles do not therefore confer power to apply the law to individual cases in the place of 
the national authorities, as permitted by Article 9 of the Directive. The German Government 
further observes that the powers conferred upon the Commission by Article 9 thus exceed those 
which, in a federal State such as the Federal Republic of Germany, are enjoyed by the Bund in 
relation to the Länder, since, under the German Basic Law, the implementation of federal laws 
rests with the Länder. Lastly, the German Government submits that Article 9 cannot be regarded 
as constituting an implementing power, within the meaning of the third indent of Article [202] 
of the [EC] Treaty, since that article does not embody a substantive power of its own, but merely 
authorizes the Council to confer implementing powers on the Commission where a legal base 
exists in primary Community law for the act to be implemented and its implementing measures.” 
This view was – partly – shared by A.G. Jacobs, cf. Germany v. Council, cited supra note 44, 
at 36, 93, esp. para 36.
47. Art. 9 provided as follows: “If the Commission becomes aware, through notiﬁcation 
given by the Member States or through information provided by them, in particular under Article 
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“The measures which the Council is empowered to take under that provi-
sion are aimed at ‘the establishment and functioning of the internal mar-
ket’. In certain ﬁelds, and particularly in that of product safety, the 
approximation of general laws alone may not be sufﬁcient to ensure the 
unity of the market. Consequently, the concept of ‘measures for the approx-
imation’ of legislation must be interpreted as encompassing the Council’ s 
power to lay down measures relating to a speciﬁc product or class of prod-
ucts and, if necessary, individual measures concerning those products.
So far as concerns the argument that the power thus conferred on the Com-
mission goes beyond that which, in a federal state such as the Federal 
Republic of Germany, is enjoyed by the Bund in relation to the Länder, it 
must be borne in mind that the rules governing the relationship between 
the Community and its Member States are not the same as those which link 
the Bund with the Länder. Furthermore, the measures taken for the imple-
mentation of Article [95] of the [EC] Treaty are addressed to Member 
States and not to their constituent entities. Nor do the powers conferred on 
the Commission by Article 9 of the directive have any bearing upon the 
division of powers within the Federal Republic of Germany.”48
Article 95 EC thus entitled the Community to adopt executive decisions. Yet, 
since the ruling dealt with a State-addressed decision, its constitutional impact 
might be confined to that category. But could the provision also be employed 
for the establishment of a centralized authorization procedure operated by the 
Commission or even the creation of the Community’s own executive infra-
structure? Subsequent jurisprudence has clarified that Article 95 EC could be 
used for both purposes. For the adoption of decisions addressed to individuals, 
7 or Article 8, of the existence of a serious and immediate risk from a product to the health and 
safety of consumers in various Member States and if: (a) one or more Member States have 
adopted measures entailing restrictions on the marketing of the product or requiring its with-
drawal from the market, such as those provided for in Article 6(1)(d) to (h); (b) Member States 
differ on the adoption of measures to deal with the risk in question; (c) the risk cannot be dealt 
with, in view of the nature of the safety issue posed by the product and in a manner compatible 
with the urgency of the case, under the other procedures laid down by the speciﬁc Community 
legislation applicable to the product or category of products concerned; and (d) the risk can be 
eliminated effectively only by adopting appropriate measures applicable at Community level, in 
order to ensure the protection of the health and safety of consumers and the proper functioning 
of the common market, the Commission, after consulting the Member States and at the request 
of at least one of them, may adopt a decision, in accordance with the procedure laid down in 
Article 11, requiring Member States to take temporary measures from among those listed in 
Article 6(1)(d) to (h).”
48. Germany v. Council, cited supra note 44, paras. 37–38, emphasis added. The Court also 
held Art. 9 of the Directive to be a “proportionate” executive power of the Community (ibid., 
para 46): “Those powers are not excessive in relation to the objectives pursued. Contrary to the 
assertion made by the German Government, the infringement procedure laid down in Article 
[226] of the [EC] Treaty does not permit the results set out in Article 9 of the directive to be 
achieved.” 
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the cause célèbre is United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council.49 The case 
concerned the validity of Regulation 2065/2003, which tried to ensure the 
effective functioning of the internal market through a Community authoriza-
tion procedure. The legislative measure delegated the power to grant or reject 
authorizations to the Commission;50 and its decisions were addressed to the 
individual applicant.51 The British government protested: “The legislative 
power conferred by Article 95 EC is a power to harmonize national laws, not 
a power to establish Community bodies or to confer tasks on such bodies, or 
to establish procedures for the approval of lists of authorised products.”52 Yet 
in its judgment, the Court confirmed this very power. Article 95 EC could be 
used as legal base for the power to adopt individual decisions.53 
 An even more general legal basis was available to the European Community: 
Article 308 EC. The Article allowed the Community to “adopt the appropriate 
measures” where this was necessary to attain one of the objectives set out in 
the Treaties. Early on, the Court clarified that this clause allowed the Com-
munity to “imply” an instrument that was not expressly mentioned in a specific 
legal base.54 The power to adopt individual decision could thus be derived – for 
every policy area within the scope of the Treaty – where this was deemed 
“necessary”. Article 308 EC thus provided an executive competence reservoir 
that coincided with the scope of the Community’s legislative powers. The EC 
Treaty thus followed the American constitutional solution. This conclusion has 
been – partly – qualified by the view that insists that the decentralized execu-
tion of European law reflects the “constitutional identity” of the European 
49. Case 66/04, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, [2005] ECR I-10553. In rela-
tion to use of Art. 95 EC to create a Community body, see Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. 
Parliament and Council (ENISA), [2006] ECR I-3771, especially para 44: “The legislature may 
deem it necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community body responsible for contrib-
uting to the implementation of a process of harmonisation in situations where, in order to facili-
tate the uniform implementation and application of acts based on that provision, the adoption of 
non-binding supporting and framework measures seems appropriate.”
50. According to the authorization procedure set out in Regulation 2065/2003 (O.J. 2003, 
L 309/1), an individual applicant would need to send his application to the competent national 
authority, which would send the application to the European Food Safety Authority (ibid., Art. 
7). The EFSA would then forward its opinion on the application to the Commission, the Member 
States and the applicant (ibid., Art. 8). The Commission would take the ﬁnal decision (ibid., Art. 
9), in accordance with the procedure set out in Art. 19(2) of the Regulation. 
51. Art. 9(1)(b) of the Regulation; and see also Art. 11(1) of the Regulation.
52. United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, cited supra note 49, para 18.
53. Ibid., para 64.
54. On the constitutional availability of Art. 308 EC in this situation, see Schütze, “Orga-
nized change towards an ‘ever closer union’: Article 308 EC and the limits to the Community’s 
legislative competence”, 22 YEL (2003), 79, at 95: “The two dimensions of power: Regulatory 
instruments and Article 308 EC”.
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Community.55 From this perspective, executive federalism as such poses 
an external limit to the Community’s power to establish its own executive 
machinery.56  
3.2. The “European Union” (after Lisbon): Solid foundations of executive  
 power?
In what ways has the Lisbon Treaty changed the executive powers of the 
Union? The amendments introduced at Lisbon are novel and fundamental. The 
executive powers of the Union are given firmer constitutional foundations.57 
The new Article 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) appears to textually confirm the connection between the legislative 
and executive powers of the Union. It states: 
“1. Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to 
implement legally binding Union acts. 
2. Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts 
are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commis-
sion, or, in duly justiﬁed speciﬁc cases and in the cases provided for in 
Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Council. 
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure, shall lay down in advance the rules and general principles 
concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commis-
sion’s exercise of implementing powers…”
Paragraph 1 confirms that the Member States will generally enjoy the power 
to execute legally binding acts of the European Union. The recognition of an 
autonomous national competence is couched in terms of a European obligation: 
55. In this sense: Klepper, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 89 (emphasis added): “Beim Einsatz der 
Ermächtigung aus Art. 308 EGV muß der Gemeinschaftsgesetzgeber stets darauf achten, daß er 
die Grenze zur Vertragsveränderung nicht überschreitet. Art. 308 kann nur für solche Maßnah-
men in Anspruch genommen werden, die sich in die vorgefundenen Grundstruktur des EG-Ver-
trages einfügen. Deshalb dürfen auf Art. 308 EGV keine Kompetenzzuweisungen gestützt 
werden, durch die die administrative Aufgabenverteilung zwischen Gemeinschaft und Mitglied-
staaten grundlegend verändert würde. Insbesondere scheidet die Einführung einer allgemeinen 
Vollzugsbefugnis der Gemeinschaft aus.”
56. For a discussion of the “external limits” of Art. 308 EC, see Schütze, op. cit. supra note 
17, p. 140 et seq.
57. For the opposite view, Nettesheim, “Die Kompetenzordnung im Vertrag über eine Ver-
fassung für Europa”, 39 EuR (2004), 511, at 522: “Eine wirkliche Lücke weist der Vertrag über 
eine Verfassung für Europa insofern auf, als er sich der Frage der Verteilung der Verwaltungszu-
ständigkeiten nicht annimmt.” However, the Constitutional Treaty speciﬁcally dealt with the 
executive power of the Union in Art. I-37 entitled “Implementing Acts”. The provision was 
equivalent to Art. 291 TFEU. 
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the Member States are under the obligation to use their competence to imple-
ment European law. This particular obligation specifies the general duty of 
“sincere cooperation” codified in Article 4 TEU, which obliges the Member 
States to “take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from acts of 
the institutions of the Union”.58 The Lisbon Treaty here confirms and consti-
tutionalizes the decentralized application of European law by the Member 
States – and with it the idea of executive federalism.
 According to Article 291(2) TFEU the Union is entitled to implement its 
own law, “[w]here uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union 
acts are needed”. Should we see Article 291(2) as an independent legal basis 
for Union executive action; or should we confine its meaning to an inter-
institutional dimension? This is a difficult question. The wording of the provi-
sion provides an argument in favour of the latter view, as it textually resembles 
ex-Article 202 EC. However, systemic and teleological considerations lead to 
a different interpretation. Unlike Article 202 EC, Article 291 TFEU is not 
confined to regulating the horizontal relationship between Union institutions 
but refers in paragraph 1 to the vertical relations between the Union and the 
Member States. A systemic reading of Article 291 TFEU might thus suggest 
that while the Member States are principally responsible under paragraph 1, 
the Union will be competent under paragraph 2. The Union competence would 
thereby derive from Article 291(2) as such, while the specific Union act only 
regulates the delegation of implementing power to the Commission (Council).59 
This systemic interpretation is reinforced by teleological considerations. A 
competence reading of Article 291 TFEU would allow the Union to adopt any 
type of implementing act – including implementing decisions – without 
recourse to Article 352 TFEU.60 This reading would thus provide the Union 
with solid legal foundation for its executive action. 
 If European constitutionalism came to accept Article 291(2) TFEU as the 
new executive reservoir of the Union, what would its legal characteristics be? 
58. Art. 4(3) TEU (Lisbon).
59. Some have even claimed that the Commission enjoys an autonomous power under Art. 
291(2) TFEU, cf. Jacque, “Le Traité de Lisbonne: Une vue cavalière”, 44 RTDE (2008), 439, at 
480: “le pouvoir d’exécution appartient à la Commission qui ne dispose plus, comme dans la 
situation actuelle, d’un pouvoir délégué, mais d’un pouvoir propre”. 
60. For example: Art. 207 TFEU only permits the Union to exercise its Common Commer-
cial Policy competence by means of two instruments: regulations and international agreements. 
All internal “measures deﬁning the framework for implementing the common commercial pol-
icy” must be adopted “by means of regulations” and “in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure” (para 2). Art. 207 TFEU will not, as such, entitle the Union to adopt individual deci-
sions. And this morphological limitation is to stay even if the Union legislator decides to dele-
gate implementation power to the Commission, since Art. 290 TFEU speciﬁes that the 
Commission can only adopt “non-legislative acts of general application” (para 1). 
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The provision would henceforth replace Article 308 EC as the Union’s general 
executive competence, but like the latter it would only be a lex generalis. 
Wherever the Treaties establish a special regime for the implementation of 
European law,61 the latter will take constitutional priority over Article 291 
TFEU. But while it thus shares a “subsidiary” character with Article 308 EC,62 
the procedure according to which the Union may exercise its executive powers 
would have fundamentally changed. Whereas Article 308 EC required unanim-
ity in the Council – giving each Member State a decisional veto over the adop-
tion of a European executive act – the Lisbon Treaty continues the 
transformation of the executive function from decisional intergovernmentalism 
to decisional supranationalism. For while the powers of the Commission will 
be subject to “mechanisms for control by Member States”, these control mech-
anisms will not give a veto power to each Member State.63 
 What are we to expect from the control mechanisms under Article 291(3) 
TFEU? The paragraph refers to control by the Member States – not the Coun-
cil or the Parliament. Are both Union institutions thus constitutionally excluded 
from controlling the Commission? The Commission has indeed made this 
argument.64 It claims that Article 291 TFEU does “not provide any role for the 
European Parliament and the Council to control the Commission”. “Such con-
trol can only be exercised by the Member States”.65 The Commission suggests 
replacing the existing management and regulatory procedures with a new 
“examination” procedure.66 This new procedure would allow a qualified 
61. We can identify an executive lex specialis in the context of competition law in Art. 105 
TFEU. It provides that “the Commission shall ensure the application of the principles laid down 
in Articles 101 and 102”. It shall thereby “investigate cases of suspected infringement of these 
principles” (para 1). Para 3 offers a speciﬁc legal base for implementing measures of a regulatory 
nature: “The Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of agreement in 
respect of which the Council has adopted a regulation or a directive pursuant to Article 103(2)
(b).” After the Lisbon Treaty, the basic Council Regulation in this context continues to be Regu-
lation 19/65 on the basis of which the Commission has recently enacted Commission Regulation 
330/2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (O.J. 2010, L 102/1).
62. On the “subsidiary” character of Art. 308 EC in the Community legal order, see Schütze, 
op. cit. supra note 54, 99 et seq.
63. Art. 291(3) TFEU provides that these control mechanisms have to be agreed by means of 
the “ordinary” legislative procedure. This makes it unlikely that the Union legislator will allow 
for a national veto power.
64. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise 
of implementing powers, COM(2010)83 ﬁnal.
65. Ibid., 2.
66. The advisory procedure, by contrast, would continue to exist and only oblige the Com-
mission to “take ... the utmost account of the conclusions drawn from the discussions within the 
committee and of the opinion delivered” (ibid., Art. 4(2)).
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 majority of Member States – not the Council – to prevent the adoption of a 
draft Commission measure.67 It is hard to imagine that the Parliament or the 
Council will be pleased by this idea.68 
 To conclude this section: regardless of whether Article 291 TFEU comes to 
be seen as a general executive competence, the Lisbon Treaty has consolidated 
the European legal order’s own species of executive federalism. As with Ger-
man federalism, the Member States are entitled and obliged to executive fed-
eral law; but unlike German federalism, the Union also enjoys general 
executive competence that matches its legislative competence. Wherever the 
decentralized execution proves defective and the uniform implementation of 
federal law is needed, the centralized execution of European law will be con-
stitutionally possible. European constitutionalism thus partly follows the 
American federal design in which the Union’s legislative and executive spheres 
coincide;69 but unlike American federalism, these federal executive powers 
provide only a second-best solution. The Union’s executive powers are sub-
sidiary to the executive powers of the Member States. European constitution-
alism thus combines the two federal traditions into its own constitutional brand. 
 This European species of “executive federalism” poses its own constitutional 
problems. What are the limits to the States’ executive powers, and when will 
the Union decide to centralize the enforcement of its own law? What are the 
constitutional principles governing the Union’s executive powers? Are there 
instances of “mixed administration”? These questions will be analysed in the 
next section. 
4. “Executive federalism”: Constitutional limits to the national and 
European enforcement of Union law
The European Union’s solution to combine the American and German federal 
models has been placed on firmer constitutional foundations by the Lisbon 
67. Ibid., Art. 5(3).
68. For a taste of the Council’s position on the issue, see Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament pursuant to Art. 294(6) TFEU, COM(2010)67 ﬁnal, 5–6. 
69. For a similar conclusion, see Dubey, op. cit. supra note 18, at 97: “Mais, contrairement à 
une idée assez largement répandue, la dissociation fréquente entre compétence exécutive et com-
pétence législative ne résulte pas directement du caractère fonctionnel de ce principe [d’attribu-
tion]. En réalité, lorsque son attribution à l’un ou l’autre des niveaux de pouvoir ne ressort pas 
expressément d’une prescription des traités, la compétence d’exécuter le droit communautaire 
adopté en conformité avec les traités appartient aussi, sur le principe, à la collectivité titulaire de 
la compétence législative.” However, the author arrives at this conclusion by means of a differ-
ent and – in my view – mistaken path. For it is claimed that Arts. 202 and 211 EC and Art. 6(4) 
TEU (Maastricht) provide the Community with general executive competences.
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Treaty. In the enforcement of European law, the Union’s shared executive 
powers are subsidiary to the executive powers of the Member States.70 Article 
291 TFEU thereby continues a position traditionally taken by the Court of 
Justice. The Court has long found “that according to the general principles on 
which the institutional system is based and which govern the relations between 
the [Union] and the Member States, it is for the Member States, in the absence 
of any contrary provision of [European] law, to ensure that [those rules] … are 
implemented within their territory”.71 The Union legal order therefore princi-
pally enlists the Member States to enforce European law (section 4.1.), and 
only where the latter encounter constitutional limits that affect the uniform 
application of European law will it centralize the enforcement of European 
law (section 4.2.). After a discussion of both enforcement methods and the 
constitutional principles that guide them, we shall – thirdly – look at situations 
of “mixed administration” (section 4.3.). 
70. Are there exclusive executive competences of the EU? Textually, Art. 2 TFEU applies the 
category of exclusive competence to areas in which the Union “may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts” (Art. 2(1) TFEU – emphasis added). The possibility of executive measures falling 
within this category is recognized. Has the Treaty tied the categorization of all “non-legislative” 
competences to the classiﬁcation of the Union’s “legislative” competences? Let us look at this 
question in the context of the Common Commercial Policy. This is an area of exclusive Union 
power (cf. Art. 3(e) TFEU). Will this mean that the Member State authorities can only enforce 
common commercial policy law on the basis of an authorization by the Union? This is not the 
case; and there are constitutional reasons for this state of affairs. Indeed, Art. 207 TFEU only 
permits the Union to exercise its CCP competence by means of general measures (supra note 
60). While we can identify an exclusive competence of the Commission to implement the CCP 
through acts of general application under Art. 290 TFEU, the provision cannot be the source of 
an exclusive competence to adopt individual decisions. The executive competence to apply 
Union law to speciﬁc cases will thus have to be founded in a general competence of the Union 
to execute its own law, that is: either Art. 291 or Art. 352 TFEU. But this provision only grants 
a shared power to implement European law to the Union. Moreover, Art. 2(1) TFEU appears to 
recognize autonomous implementing powers of the Member States within the exclusive compe-
tences of the Union, since it seems to drop the requirement of a Union empowerment for national 
implementing actions. This theoretical result – exclusive legislative competence ﬂanked by a 
shared executive competence – reﬂects past constitutional practice, cf. Regulation 2913/92 
establishing the Community Customs Code (O.J. 1992, L 302/1).
71. Joined Cases 89 & 91/86, L’ Étoile Commerciale and Comptoir National Technique 
Agricole (CNTA) v. Commission, [1987] ECR 3005, para 11. See also Case C-476/93 P, Nutral 
v. Commission, [1995] ECR 4125, para 14: “according to the institutional system of the Com-
munity and the rules governing relations between the Community and the Member States, it is 
for the latter, in the absence of any contrary provision of Community law, to ensure that Com-
munity regulations, particularly those concerning the common agricultural policy, are imple-
mented within their territory.”
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4.1. The Member States (primary) executive powers and their constitutional 
limits 
4.1.1. Substantive limits: Union pre-emption of national enforcement 
Where shared executive powers exist, two independent administrations may 
enforce legal norms autonomously. In the European legal order, the shared 
powers of the national administrations will however be subject to the principles 
of supremacy and pre-emption.72 The substantive limits thereby created for 
national administrations depend on the extent to which the European admin-
istration chooses to “pre-empt” the Member States. It may thereby limit the 
substantive discretion of national authorities in two ways: either the Union 
itself adopts an executive decision and requires national authorities to respect 
it; or, Union legislation requires national authorities to take into account a 
decision issued by an administrative authority of another Member State. In the 
first scenario, a European decision directly limits the discretion of a national 
administration; in the second situation European law only exercises an indirect 
pre-emptive effect on national administrations through the principle of mutual 
recognition.73
72. On the two principles in the context the Union’s legislative (regulatory) sphere, see 
Schütze, “Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slowly emergent doctrine of Community 
pre-emption”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1023. 
73. The (European) obligation to – in principle – recognize the decisions of “sister” State 
administrations may follow directly from the Treaty’s free movement provisions, such as Art. 35 
TFEU. In Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital SL and Administracíon General del Estado, 
[2002] ECR 507, paras. 35–36, the Court thus held: “First, it is settled case law that a system of 
prior administrative authorization cannot legitimize discretionary conduct on the part of the 
national authorities which is liable to negate the effectiveness of provisions of Community law, 
particularly those relating to the fundamental freedoms at issue in the main proceedings”. 
“Therefore, if a prior administrative authorization scheme is to be justiﬁed even though it dero-
gates from such fundamental freedoms, it must, in any event, be based on objective, non-dis-
criminatory criteria which are known in advance to the undertakings concerned, in such a way 
as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities’ discretion, so that it is not used arbi-
trarily”. “Second, a measure introduced by a Member State cannot be regarded as necessary to 
achieve the aim pursued if it essentially duplicates controls which have already been carried out 
in the context of other procedures, either in the same State or in another Member State.” Alter-
natively, European obligations to recognize administrative decisions of another Member State 
may be established in secondary law. For an illustration of the mutual recognition of State 
administrative action established in European legislation, see Directive 2001/83 on the Commu-
nity code relating to medicinal products for human use (O.J. 2001, L 311/67). Following Art. 
111(1) of the Regulation, the competent authority of the Member State concerned shall ensure, 
by means of repeated inspections that the legal requirements governing medicinal products are 
complied with. The conclusions reached by the competent national authority shall thereby “be 
valid throughout the Community” (Art. 122(3) of the Regulation). However, in exceptional 
cases relating to public health, a Member State may demand a second independent inspection.
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 Let us concentrate on the direct pre-emption of national administrations. 
The degree of executive pre-emption by the Union may thereby differ. In the 
most extreme situation, national administrations are completely pre-empted 
from applying European law. This happened in the area of competition law 
through the first enforcement regulation: Regulation 17/62.74 According to the 
Regulation, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU needed to be applied “in a uniform 
manner in the Member States”;75 and to achieve this result, it required under-
takings that sought application of Article 101(3) TFEU to notify their agree-
ments to the Commission. The Commission was thus granted the “sole power 
to declare Article [101 (1)] inapplicable pursuant to Article [101(3)] of the 
Treaty”.76 Compared to other areas of European law, Regulation 17/62 estab-
lished “an unusual degree of centralization”.77 It reserved to the Commission 
the ability exclusively to apply the Treaty to particular cases.78 This executive 
monopoly reached, after almost forty years, its natural limits. In the 1990s, the 
Commission began to consider a new executive framework. It suggested that 
“[a]pplication of the rules will have to be decentralized more to the Member 
States’ competition authorities”.79 This would “make better use of the comple-
mentarity that exists between the national authorities and the Commission”.80 
74. Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementing Arts. 85 and 86 of the [EEC] Treaty 
(O.J. English Special edition: Series I Chapter 1959–1 962, 87).
75. Ibid., Recital 1.
76. Ibid., Art. 9(1). However, national competition authorities were entitled to apply Art. 
101(1) subject to Art. 9(3) of the Regulation: “As long as the Commission has not initiated any 
procedure under Articles 2, 3 or 6, the authorities of the Member States shall remain competent 
to apply Article [101 (1)] and Article [102] in accordance with Article [104] of the Treaty[.]”
77. Ehlermann, “The modernization of EC antitrust policy: A legal and cultural revolution”, 
37 CML Rev. (2000), 537, at 540.
78. Explanations for this high degree of executive uniformity are given in the Commission’s 
White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Arts. 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (O.J. 
1999, C 132/1), para 24: “The authorization system provided for in Regulation No 17 met the 
three main requirements identiﬁed at the time by the Commission (provision of information to 
competition authorities, uniform application of the competition rules in the Community and 
legal certainty for undertakings). It allowed a coherent corpus of rules to be developed and 
applied uniformly in the Community, thus contributing signiﬁcantly to the completion of the 
internal market.”
79. White Paper, para 46: “Application of the rules will have to be decentralized more to the 
Member States’ competition authorities and to the national courts. The competition authorities 
are well placed to take effective action in certain types of case: they are normally well acquainted 
with local markets and national operators, some of them have an infrastructure covering the 
whole of the relevant country and can carry out investigations rapidly, and most of them have the 
human and legal resources needed to take action against infringements whose centre of gravity 
is in their territory. Lastly, they are closer to complainants, who will more readily turn to a 
national authority than to the Commission.”
80. White Paper, para 91. This point is further explained in paras. 96–97. 
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 Regulation 1/2003 ultimately introduced a revolutionary new administrative 
regime for the enforcement of European competition law.81 The total pre-emp-
tion of national administrations with regard to Article 101(3) TFEU was 
replaced by a system of shared executive competences.82 Under the new system, 
both the Commission and the national competition authorities can enforce 
European law.83 However, the “pre-eminence” of the Commission is established 
in Article 11(6) of the Regulation: “The initiation by the Commission of pro-
ceedings for the adoption of a decision shall relieve the competition authorities 
of the Member States of their competence to apply Articles [101] and [102] 
of the Treaty”. The idea of executive pre-emption is designed to protect the 
special role of the Commission in the application of European competition 
law. The Commission – as guardian of the Treaties – is entitled to trigger 
the centralized enforcement mechanism to ensure the uniform application 
of European law.84 Through executive pre-emption, national competition 
authorities are prohibited from exercising their competence in this case.85 
 However, this  substantive limit will not as such interfere with the procedural 
autonomy of the national authorities. Article 11 does not entitle the Com-
mission to issue binding instructions to national competition authorities, let 
alone to veto their decisions.86 National competition authorities are therefore 
81. Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts. 
81 and 82 of the [EC] Treaty (O.J. 2003, L 1/1).
82. Reg. 1/2003 claims to establish a system of “parallel competences” (ibid., preamble 22). 
See also Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities 
(O.J. 2004, C 101/43), esp. para 5: ‘The Council Regulation is based on a system of parallel 
competences”. The problem with this categorization is that it cannot account for the ability of the 
Commission to “pre-empt” national competition authorities. The executive competence is there-
fore of a shared (or even better: concurrent) nature.
83. Art. 5 of Reg. 1/2003 states: “The competition authorities of the Member States shall 
have the power to apply Articles [101 and 102] of the [FEU] Treaty in individual cases. For this 
purpose, acting on their own initiative or on a complaint, they may take the following decisions”. 
It is important to remember that this is not an “enabling” provision or a delegation of European 
executive power to national authorities. Regulation 1/2003 simply clariﬁes that the national 
competition authorities will be able to enforce EU law in their own right. 
84. White Paper (cited supra note 78), para 83.
85. They are also subject to Art. 16(2) of Reg. 1/2003. The Article states: “When competition 
authorities of the Member States rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article [101] 
or Article [102] of the [FEU] Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission decision, 
they cannot take decisions which would run counter to the decision adopted by the Commis-
sion.”
86. Art. 11 of Reg. 1/2003 lays down the rules of cooperation between the Commission and 
the national competition authorities. According to its para (3), the national authorities must 
inform the Commission of their decision to commence a formal investigation. Para 4 even 
obliges them “[n]o later than 30 days before the adoption of a decision” to forward the draft deci-
sion to the Commission. However, there is no obligation to consult the Commission on the case 
(cf. Art. 11(5): “The competition authorities of the Member States may consult the Commission 
on any case involving the application of Community law.” Emphasis added). More importantly, 
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not integrated into or hierarchically subordinated to the European Commis-
sion.87 
 In conclusion, the current enforcement system in the area of competition 
law – and beyond – is based on the idea of shared competences. National 
executive action may be “pre-empted” by the decision of the Union to apply 
the law itself. Yet, executive pre-emption is only a substantive and external 
limitation on the discretion of national authorities. It “interferes much less with 
the autonomy of national competition authorities than the requirement of Com-
mission consent or the right of the Commission to annul a national decision”, 
since the latter would “introduce an element of administrative hierarchy that 
is conspicuously absent in the EC Treaty”.88 This administrative hierarchy and 
integration is – as a matter of principle – not part of Europe’s executive fed-
eralism.89
4.1.2. Procedural limits: Inroads into national administrative autonomy
Classic international law leaves the enforcement of its norms to the States 
themselves. The national administrative structure is beyond its reach. When 
founded in 1957, the European legal order followed this logic. While it would 
“centralize” the question of direct effect, it appeared to leave the administra-
tive autonomy of the Member States untouched. Article 5 of the original Rome 
Treaty simply stated: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulﬁlment of the obligations arising 
out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community.” This general duty would become known as the duty of loyal 
the Commission will not have the right to provide a binding interpretation on the application of 
Arts. 101 and 102 to the national competition authorities or to veto their decision (cf. Bardong, 
“Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003” in Hirsch et al. (Eds.), Competition Law: European Commu-
nity Practice and Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at p. 1658). The administrative coopera-
tion between the Commission and the national authorities thus contrasts with the constitutional 
principles for the judicial cooperation between the ECJ and the national courts under Art. 267 
TFEU. However, national administrative authorities will also be subject to special duties vis-à-
vis the European judiciary, cf. Case C-453/00, Kühne & Haitz, [2004] ECR 837, para 27: “In 
such circumstances, the administrative body concerned is, in accordance with the principle of 
cooperation arising from Article 10 EC, under an obligation to review that decision in order to 
take account of the interpretation of the relevant provision of Community law given in the mean-
time by the Court. The administrative body will have to determine on the basis of the outcome 
of that review to what extent it is under an obligation to reopen, without adversely affecting the 
interests of third parties, the decision in question.” 
87. There is no “appeal” procedure to the European Commission from a national competition 
authority. If an undertaking wishes to challenge an administrative decision by a national compe-
tition authority, it will need to do so in the national courts. From there, a preliminary reference 
procedure may bring the issue before the ECJ. 
88. Ehlermann, op. cit. supra note 77, 578.
89. On possible forms of mixed administration, see section 4.3. infra. 
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cooperation and can today be found – in slightly amended form – in Article 4 
TEU (Lisbon).90 The duty limits the procedural autonomy of the Member 
States, where this procedural freedom leads to significant differences in the 
application of substantive European law. 
 How has the Court of Justice interpreted this duty in the context of the 
Union’s executive federalism? The Court started out by recognizing, in prin-
ciple, the procedural autonomy of the Member States in the enforcement of 
European law: “Where national authorities are responsible for implementing 
a [Union] regulation it must be recognized that in principle this implementation 
takes place with due respect for the forms and procedures of national law.”91 
“Although under Article [4 of the TEU] the Member States are obliged to take 
all appropriate measures whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaty, it is for them to determine which 
institutions within the national system shall be empowered to adopt the said 
measures.”92 More than that: “the national authorities when implementing 
[European] regulations act in accordance with the procedural and substantive 
rules of their own national law”.93 However, according to the Court, this pro-
cedural autonomy was not absolute. The administrative autonomy of the Mem-
ber States had to be reconciled with the need to apply European law uniformly. 
The European legal order has thus also imposed procedural limits on the exec-
utive powers of the Member States. These procedural limitations make the 
decentralized application of European law by the Member States a form of 
executive federalism.
 What are these procedural limits? National administrative rules are subject 
to the constitutional principles of equivalence and effectiveness.94 And if these 
90. After the Lisbon amendments, Art. 4(3) TEU now states: “The Member States shall take 
any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulﬁlment of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.”
91. Case 39/70, Norddeutsches Vieh- und Fleischkontor GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-
St. Annen, [1971] ECR 49, para 4.
92. Joined Cases 51-54/71, International Fruit Company NV and others v. Produktschap 
voor groenten en fruit, [1971] ECR 1107, para 3.
93. Joined Cases 205-215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH and others v. Federal Republic 
of Germany, [1983] ECR 2633, para 17.
94. Discussion of these two constitutional principles is typically conﬁned to the context of 
judicial remedies. However, they equally apply – mutatis mutandis – to administrative remedies. 
The Court thus conﬁrmed the principles of effectiveness and equivalence in Deutsche Milchkan-
tor (ibid., paras. 22–23) as well as Case C-201/02, The Queen on the application of Delena Wells 
v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2004] ECR I-723: “[U]nder Article 10 EC the competent 
authorities are obliged to take, within the sphere of their competence, all general or particular 
measures for remedying the failure to carry out an assessment of the environmental effects of a 
project as provided for in Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337. The detailed procedural rules appli-
cable in that context are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the 
principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided that they are not less favour-
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negative limits are not sufficient, the Union can harmonize national adminis-
trative procedures.95 What legal bases will the Union dispose of to adopt com-
mon administrative procedures? The power to harmonize national 
administrative law has always been part of the Union’s harmonization power. 
The original Rome Treaty already allowed the Community to “issue directives 
for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in the Member States”.96 The competence to harmonize 
national administrative procedures has been widely used in the past.97 The 
Lisbon Treaty has now inserted a new special constitutional base: Article 197 
TFEU. This Article constitutes by itself Title XXIV dealing with the “Admin-
istrative Cooperation” between the European Union and the Member States. 
The provision states:
“1. Effective implementation of Union law by the Member States, which 
is essential for the proper functioning of the Union, shall be regarded as a 
matter of common interest. 
2. The Union may support the efforts of Member States to improve their 
administrative capacity to implement Union law. Such action may include 
facilitating the exchange of information and of civil servants as well as 
supporting training schemes. No Member State shall be obliged to avail 
itself of such support. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by 
means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative proce-
dure, shall establish the necessary measures to this end, excluding any 
harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.…”
The decentralized implementation of European law is – unsurprisingly – of 
central interest to the Union. To guarantee an effective implementation, the 
able than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do 
not render impossible in practice or excessively difﬁcult the exercise of rights conferred by the 
Community legal order (principle of effectiveness).”
95. Deutsche Milchkontor, cited supra note 93, para 24: “if the disparities in the legislation 
of Member States proved to be such as to compromise the equal treatment of producers and trad-
ers in different Member States or distort or impair the functioning of the Common Market, it 
would be for the competent Community institutions to adopt the provisions needed to remedy 
such disparities”.
96. Art. 100(1) EEC (emphasis added). 
97. For a good illustration of this, see Regulation 510/2006 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (O.J. 2006, 
L 93/12). According to its Art. 5(5) “the Member State shall initiate a national objection proce-
dure ensuring adequate publication of the application and providing for a reasonable period 
within which any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established or resident 
on its territory may lodge an objection to the application”. Moreover: “The Member State shall 
ensure that its favourable decision is made public and that any natural or legal person having a 
legitimate interest has means of appeal.” See also Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (O.J. 
2002, L 108/33), esp. Arts. 3(2) and 4(1). 
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Union may decide to “support the efforts of Member States to improve their 
administrative capacity to implement Union law”. But this Union support is 
entirely voluntary and the European legislation adopted under this competence 
must not entail “any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States”. This constitutional limitation is to be regretted. The trimming of the 
power to a “complementary competence” may well have an ironic effect.98 In 
blocking the European streamlining of (inefficient) national administrations, 
the provision protects their formal organizational autonomy.99 However, the 
refusal to allow for the harmonization of national administrative capacities 
through Union legislation may indirectly favour the centralized intervention 
by the Union under Article 291(2) TFEU. Thus, in excluding the Union’s com-
petence to harmonize national administrative law, the authors of the Lisbon 
Treaty placed procedural autonomy over substantive autonomy. This consti-
tutional choice may – ironically – reduce the scope of the decentralized execu-
tion of Union law by the Member States. 100
4.1.3. Morphological limits: Beyond the territoriality principle? 
Within the German species of “executive federalism”, each State executes 
federal law and a State’s administrative decision has legal validity within the 
entire federation.101 State administrations, while acting “in their own right” 
operate – even territorially – as decentralized federal authorities. 
 Has the European Union followed this species of “executive federalism” 
and acknowledged the decentralized execution of federal law with a centralized 
98. The competence is mentioned as a complementary competence in Art. 6(g) TFEU.
99. However, this protection will not be absolute: see Art. 197(3) TFEU: “This Article shall 
be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States to implement Union law or to the 
prerogatives and duties of the Commission. It shall also be without prejudice to other provisions 
of the Treaties providing for administrative cooperation among the Member States and between 
them and the Union.”
100. To add a footnote to this conclusion: Article 114 TFEU may – after Case C-376/98, 
Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising), [2000] ECR I-8419 – still provide a 
legal basis for the harmonization of national administrative provisions despite the existence of a 
“saving clause” under Art. 197(2) TFEU. (On the status of these “saving clauses” and their rela-
tion to Art. 114 TFEU, see Schütze, op. cit. supra note 56, at p. 149 et seq.) However, it may be 
doubted whether Art. 114 could ever be used to adopt a comprehensive “European Administra-
tive Code”. It may thus be far too early to proclaim that it is “time to re-examine the considera-
tions for establishing an administrative code for administrative procedures in the sphere of EU 
law” (Hofmann and Türk, “Legal challenges in EU administrative law by the move to an 
 integrated administration” in Hofmann and Türk (Eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative 
Law (Elgar, 2009), p. 379). For a similar conclusion, albeit in the context of Art. III-285 of the 
Constitutional Treaty, see Schwarze, EU Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), ccxix: 
“a long way from being a possible future legal base for the creation of a comprehensive Euro-
pean administrative law or even just serving as a tool for the development of a general adminis-
trative procedural code”.
101. See section 2.2. supra, esp.note 33.
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effect? Is there, in other words, a State execution of European law pro unione?102 
With the EU’s international origin, the European treaties started from the idea 
of an indirect execution pro statu. This followed from the territoriality prin-
ciple, according to which national powers can only unfold effects within the 
national territory. Administrative decisions within the Member States, even 
when executing European law, would therefore be adopted in complete isola-
tion and independence. The administrative decision within one Member State 
would have no effects within another. This “morphological” limitation of 
national action stemmed from their territorially limited validity. 
 The potential difficulties resulting from diverse national administrative prac-
tices were soon realized. In the context of competition law, the Union was thus 
given the power to centralize the application of European law if there was a 
danger of administrative inconsistency. In other policy areas, the Union legis-
lator began to build cooperative horizontal relationships between national 
authorities. These horizontal relationships were to facilitate the mutual recog-
nition of their administrative acts.
 While not required automatically to give validity to administrative decisions 
of other Member States, national authorities are nonetheless subject to proce-
dural and substantive duties imposed by European law.103 In some areas, the 
Union even grants automatic trans-national validity to national administrative 
acts.104 An illustration of this technique can be found in the Union Customs 
Code.105 Its Article 250 – entitled “Legal effects in a Member State of measures 
taken, documents issued and findings made in another Member State” – reads 
as follows: 
“Where a customs procedure is used in several Member States, 
– the decisions, identiﬁcation measures taken or agreed on, and the 
documents issued by the customs authorities of one Member State 
shall have the same legal effects in other Member States as such 
decisions, measures taken and documents issued by the customs 
authorities of each of those Member States 
102. The terminological dichotomy between the application of European law “pro communi-
tate” and the application “pro statu” was introduced by Winter, “Kompetenzverteilung und 
Legitimation in der europäischen Mehrebenenverwaltung”, 40 EuR (2005), 255, at 256. The 
formulation “actio pro unione” has been developed by Bast, “Transnationale Verwaltung des 
Europäischen Migrationsraums”, 46 Der Staat (2007), 1. 
103. This idea has been named “reference model” and is extensively discussed by Sydow, 
Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen Union (Mohr Siebeck, 2004).
104. The term has been coined by Schmidt-Aßmann, “Verwaltungskooperation und Verwal-
tungskooperationsrecht in der Europäischen Verwaltung,” 31 EuR (1996), 270, at 301, distin-
guishing between “true” and “mediated” transnationality.
105. Regulation 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (O.J. 1992, L 302/1). 
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– the ﬁndings made at the time controls are carried out by the customs 
authorities of a Member State shall have the same conclusive force 
in the other Member States as the ﬁndings made by the customs 
authorities of each of those Member States.” 
We find similar investitures of transnational effects to national executive acts 
in other areas of European law.106 However, the national execution of European 
law pro unione constitutes an exception. Could the European legislator decide 
to give such transnational effects to all national administrative acts? Article 
291(2) TFEU could not be used as a legal basis for such a – radical – decision, 
for it only entitles the Union to replace the Member States’ indirect execution 
of European law by means of its direct involvement. Neither does Article 114 
TFEU seem apposite for a decision to generally grant transnational effects to 
national executive action, as the latter would not “harmonize” national laws 
or administrative actions. The only possible contender is Article 352 TFEU. 
However, even this provision would find an external limit in the (present) 
constitutional identity of the Union; and this identity would be changed if the 
Union were to move – wholesale – from the decentralized enforcement of 
European law pro statu to the decentralized enforcement of European law pro 
unione.
4.2. The Union’s (subsidiary) executive powers and their limits 
4.2.1. The principle of subsidiarity as a constitutional safeguard 
The national execution of European law has “the invaluable advantage of 
bringing citizens closer to the still strange and new European order by employ-
ing the authority and familiar garb of their national order – and not to forget: 
by speaking their own language”.107 Ever since the Maastricht Treaty, the Union 
legal order has emphasized the constitutional nexus between the principle of 
106. For example: Regulation 116/2009 on the export of cultural goods (Codiﬁed version) 
(O.J. 2009, L 39/1) makes the export of cultural goods outside the customs territory of the Union 
subject to an export licence and decrees that this licence shall be issued “by a competent national 
authority” deﬁned in Art. 2(2). Art. 2(3) then “Europeanizes” this national decision: “The export 
licence shall be valid throughout the Community.” See also Regulation 428/2009 setting up a 
Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items 
(O.J. 2009, L 134/1), whose Art. 9(2) states: “For all other exports for which an authorization is 
required under this Regulation, such authorization shall be granted by the competent authorities 
of the Member State where the exporter is established. Subject to the restrictions speciﬁed in 
paragraph 4, this authorization may be an individual, global or general authorization. All the 
authorizations shall be valid throughout the Community.”
107. Hallstein, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat. Europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse 
(Econ, 1994), p. 59 (translation – RS). 
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 subsidiarity and “executive federalism”.108 The Amsterdam Protocol on 
Subsidiarity pointed out that “care should be taken to respect well established 
national arrangements and the organization and working of Member States’ 
legal systems”.109 The Declaration relating to the Subsidiarity Protocol was 
even more direct. It confirmed that “the administrative implementation of 
C ommunity law shall in principle be the responsibility of the Member States 
in accordance with their constitutional arrangements”.110 The Lisbon Treaty 
“continue[s] the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity”.111 
 The subsidiarity principle is now defined in Article 5(3) TEU: 
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufﬁciently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
at Union level.” 
The wording of the principle covers to any action by the Union. This has – 
from the very beginning – been understood to include executive action.112 The 
principle of executive subsidiarity asks whether the Member States or the 
European Union will better achieve the implementation of European law.  
Executive subsidiarity thereby operates independently from the principle’s 
application in the legislative sphere. Thus: even when centralized legislative 
action by the Union is justified under the subsidiarity principle, the latter may 
nonetheless mandate the decentralized execution of European legislation by 
the Member States. 
108. Commission, Communication on the Principle of Subsidiarity, EC Bulletin 10-1992, 
116 at 117: “[T]here should be careful examination of the possibilities of decentralizing the man-
agement of Community action … This corresponds to the need to maintain such actions, as close 
to the citizen as possible.”
109. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (1997), 
point 7.
110. Declaration relating to the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality. The Laeken Declaration was less committed and simply asked: “should not 
the day-to-day administration and implementation of the Union’s policy be left more emphati-
cally to the Member States and, where their constitutions so provide, to the regions?”
111. Treaty on European Union (Lisbon), Recital 13.
112. Ehlermann, “Quelques réﬂexions sur la communication de la Commission relative au 
principe de subsidiarité”, (1992) Revue du marché unique européen, 215, at 218: “le test de la 
subsidiarité ne se limite pas à l’action législative. Il s’applique également au niveau de l’action 
administrative, c’est-a-dire de l’execution de la réglementation communautaire et du controle de 
l’execution”. 
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 What criteria have the European legislator or the European Courts developed 
to clarify the contours of executive subsidiarity? Let us first look at legislative 
definitions. We find such a legislative expression of executive subsidiarity in 
the European framework governing the authorization of medicinal products.113 
The authorization procedure follows – with the exception of certain products114 
– a decentralized mechanism.115 The competent national authority must verify 
whether the application submitted fulfils the European rules, and if this is the 
case issue a marketing authorization.116 However, for parallel applications in 
two or more Member States, the national administrative procedure is aban-
doned and a “[m]utual recognition and decentralized procedure” applies. The 
applicant thereby requests one Member State to act as “reference Member 
State”.117 The reference Member State will prepare a draft assessment report; 
and if all the concerned Member States approve the assessment report, each 
Member State in which the application has been submitted adopts an authori-
zation decision for its territory.118 However, where a Member State disapproves 
of the assessment report on the ground of a potential serious risk to public 
health, the matter is referred to the European Medicines Agency and the Com-
mission will finally decide.119 The disagreement of a single Member State will 
thus be enough to trigger the central execution of European law by the Euro-
pean administration.120
113. Directive 2001/83 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for human 
use (O.J. 2001, L 311/67). 
114. In addition to the decentralized authorization procedure established by Directive 
2001/83, this area also has a centralized authorization procedure, cf. Regulation 726/2004 laying 
down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for 
human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicine Agency (O.J. 2004, L 136/1). 
This form of direct European administration applies for certain products deﬁned in Art. 3 of the 
Regulation.
115. Cf. Arts. 3 and 8 of Directive 2001/83. 
116. Ibid., Arts. 19 and 21. 
117. Ibid., Art. 28(1) and (2). 
118. Ibid., Art. 28(4) and (5).
119. Ibid., Arts. 33 and 34. The opinion of the agency is prepared by the “Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use”.
120. We ﬁnd a similar mechanism in Regulation 258/97 concerning novel foods and novel 
food ingredients (O.J. 1997, L 43/1). According to its Art. 4, the application will need to be sub-
mitted to “the Member State in which the product is to be placed in the market for the ﬁrst time”. 
This Member State will then be asked under Art. 6(3) to draft an “initial assessment report”. The 
report is subsequently forwarded to the Commission and the Member States, which “may make 
comments or present a reasoned objection to the marketing of the food or food ingredient con-
cerned” (ibid., Art. 6(4)). Where there are no objections, the Member State can issue the author-
ization (ibid., Art. 4(2)). By contrast, where an objection is raised and an additional assessment 
is required, it is the Commission (subject to the relevant comitology procedure) that will decide 
(ibid., Arts. 7 and 13(2)). 
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 We find a second legislative definition for executive subsidiarity in the 
context of European competition law.121 The enforcement of European com-
petition law is based on a system of shared competences. It entitles the Euro-
pean Commission as well as the national competition authorities to apply 
European law; but “the competition authorities of the Member States are auto-
matically relieved of their competence if the Commission initiates its own 
proceedings”.122 Has Regulation 1/2003 subjected the discretion of the Com-
mission to centralize enforcement to a subsidiarity analysis? Article 4 and 
Article 11(6) of the Regulation are devoid of any substantive criteria in this 
respect; and Article 10 of the Regulation simply refers to the Union’s “public 
interest relating to the application of Articles [101 and 102]”.123 The principles 
governing the exercise of the Commission’s executive competences were partly 
clarified by its “Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities”.124 The Commission here specified when it considers pre-empting 
decentralized execution: 
“The Commission is particularly well placed if one or several agreement(s) 
or practice(s), including networks of similar agreements or practices, have 
effects on competition in more than three Member States (cross-border 
markets covering more than three Member States or several national mar-
kets). Moreover, the Commission is particularly well placed to deal with a 
case if it is closely linked to other Community provisions which may be 
exclusively or more effectively applied by the Commission, if the Com-
munity interest requires the adoption of a Commission decision to develop 
Community competition policy when a new competition issue arises or to 
ensure effective enforcement.”125
121. On the application of the principle of subsidiarity generally in the context of EC com-
petition law, see Idot, “L’application du principe de la subsidiarité dans le droit de la concur-
rence” in Ress and Stein (Eds.), Vorträge, Reden und Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut – Secktion 
Rechtswissenschaft – Nr. 300 (Europa-Institut, 1993); Editorial: Subsidiarity in EC competition 
law enforcement, 32 CML Rev. (1995), 1; as well as: Wesseling, “Subsidiarity in Community 
antitrust law: Setting the right agenda”, 22 EL Rev. (1997), 35.
122. Reg. 1/2003, cited supra note 81, Recital 17.
123. Ibid., recital 14: “In exceptional cases where the public interest of the [Union] so 
requires, it may also be expedient for the Commission to adopt a decision of a declaratory nature 
ﬁnding that the prohibition in Article [101] or Article [102] of the [FEU] Treaty does not apply, 
with a view to clarifying the law and ensuring its consistent application throughout the [Union], 
in particular with regard to new types of agreements or practices that have not been settled in the 
existing case law and administrative practice.”
124. Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities 
(O.J. 2004, C 101/43). The Notice is a “soft law” measure that, as such, only binds the Commis-
sion. However, according to its para 72, Member States’ competition authorities may sign a 
statement that they will abide by the principles set out in the Notice; and the Notice has indeed 
been signed by all national competition authorities. 
125. Commission Notice (ibid.), paras. 14–15.
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The centralized execution of European law would consequently be mandated, 
where one of three – alternative – criteria is met. The first criterion relates to 
the geographical scale of the competition law problem. Where more than three 
Member States are concerned executive centralization is deemed to be justi-
fied. This trans-border element has close subsidiarity overtones in that it is 
associated with the “national insufficiency” test.126 The second criterion is, by 
contrast, of a political nature. Since the Commission is responsible for the 
development of European competition policy,127 it must be able to decide 
important cases itself. Is this political guidance function in accord with the 
idea of subsidiarity? Doubts may be raised. The Commission’s ability to adopt 
regulatory measures – as opposed to executive decisions – could offer the 
desired political guidance.128 The third criterion concerns the effectiveness of 
the competition law execution. This criterion is reminiscent of the  “comparative 
efficiency test” in Article 5(3) TEU. What efficiency gains warrant executive 
centralization? We find some tentative answers in a later part of the Network 
Notice. The Commission may centralize decision-making, where the national 
administrative authorities envisage conflicting or substantively wrong deci-
sions; or, where a national authority unduly draws out proceedings in the case.129
 The two legislative mechanisms for executive subsidiarity discussed above 
provide the Commission with an extremely favourable prerogative over the 
Member State administrations. In the light of these generous legislative 
 interpretations of the subsidiarity calculus, have the European Courts insisted 
on an independent judicial control of the constitutional principle? In the past, 
the Courts have often deferred to the “political” nature of the subsidiarity 
analysis and thus recognized a wide discretion for the European legislator.130 
Have the Courts extended this laissez-faire approach to the European execu-
tive? Or, have the Courts insisted on a strict(er) judicial review of executive 
subsidiarity?
 The issue arose in France Télécom v. Commission.131 The French undertak-
ing had been subject to a Commission investigation under Regulation 1/2003 
126. On the two tests within the legislative principle of subsidiarity, see Schütze, op. cit. 
supra note 56, at p. 250. 
127. Commission Notice (cited supra note 124), recital 43: “Within the network of competi-
tion authorities the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaty, has the ultimate but not the sole 
responsibility for developing policy and safeguarding consistency when it comes to the applica-
tion of EC competition law.”
128. On the subsidiarity analysis as regards the choice of legal instrument, see Schütze 
(op. cit. supra note 54, at 144).
129. Commission Notice (cited supra note 124), para 54. 
130. On this point, see Schütze (op. cit. supra note 56, at p. 253 et seq.).
131. Case T-339/04, France Télécom SA v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-521. The case is 
extensively discussed by Rizzuto, “Parallel Competence and the Power of the EC Commission 
under Regulation 1/2003 according to the Court of First Instance”, (2008) ECLR, 286.
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and challenged its legality on the ground that the French competition authority 
would have been better able to deal with the case. The Commission, on the 
other hand, insisted that Regulation 1/2003 “preserve[d] the Commission’s 
power to act at any time against any infringement of Articles [101 and 102]”. 
Moreover, “where the Commission has competence to apply the [FEU] Treaty 
directly in individual cases, the principle of subsidiarity cannot be interpreted 
in a manner that deprives it of such competence”.132 In its judgment, the Court 
– rightly – distinguished the Commission’s (preliminary) power to undertake 
inspections from the formal initiation of proceedings for the purposes of Arti-
cle 11(6) of the Regulation.133 Yet, it – wrongly – held that the subsidiarity 
principle could never limit the Commission’s power to enforce the competition 
rules.134 
 The General Court’s judgment represents a serious blow to the idea of an 
independent judicial review of executive subsidiarity. The Court appears to 
leave the principle of executive subsidiarity completely in the hands of the 
other European institutions. This reliance on the political safeguards of feder-
alism is misplaced,135 especially in the context of the executive function. For 
while Article 291(3) TFEU envisages “mechanisms for control by Member 
States” as a general rule, these may not apply in specific executive regimes 
– like competition law. Indeed, the idea of an independent subsidiarity analy-
sis for the executive function has been reinforced under the Lisbon Treaty. 
According to Article 291 TFEU, the Commission will only possess implement-
ing powers “[w]here uniform conditions for implementing legally binding acts 
are needed”. While this provision concerns the competence of the Commission 
to adopt executive acts, it betrays the clear intention to subject the executive 
function to a subsidiarity rationale. This idea would be undermined if the 
European legislator could transfer wide implementing powers to the Com-
mission, the exercise of which would not be subjected to judicial review. The 
European Courts should therefore look beyond the legislative expressions of 
subsidiarity and apply an independent judicial review of the question of exec-
utive subsidiarity. 
132. France Télécom SA v. Commission, cited supra note 131, paras. 72–73.
133. Bardong (op. cit. supra note 86, at p. 1645): “As was the case under Art. 9(3), Regula-
tion 17/62, Art. 11(6) is not triggered when the Commission merely initiates work on a case, or 
when it takes investigatory measures. It is clear that the Commission can exercise its powers of 
investigation before it formally opens proceedings.”
134. France Télécom SA v. Commission, cited supra note 131, para 89.
135. For an elaboration of this point in the legislative sphere, see Schütze, op. cit. supra note 
56, at p. 261.
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4.2.2. Morphological limits: Safeguarding national administrative 
independence 
The constitutional pillar of Union executive power after the Lisbon Treaty 
states: “Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union 
acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the 
Commission”.136 Assuming that the Union is entitled to exercise its executive 
powers under the subsidiarity principle, will these implementation powers 
encounter additional constitutional limitations? An argument to this effect has 
been made by pointing to possible limitations inherent in the various types of 
“binding Union acts”.137 The problem is said to be twofold. First, can a directly 
applicable “regulation” ever confer implementing powers to the Commission? 
If all provisions of a regulation were automatically directly effective, there 
would be no need for Article 291(2) TFEU.138 Second, since directives must 
“leave to the national authorities the choice of form of methods” can they ever 
delegate, and thus reserve, implementing power to the Commission?139 What 
are, in general terms, the constitutional implications flowing from the use of 
a particular type of legal instrument for Europe’s executive powers? This ques-
tion concerns the “morphological” limits imposed on the European Union.140 
 The European legal order defines a “regulation” as an instrument of direct 
applicability.141 However, this must not be taken to mean that all provisions 
within a regulation need to be self-executing. Direct applicability is not direct 
effect.142 Regulations may thus contain provisions that leave their future 
 implementation to the Member States.143 And assuming that a Member State 
fails to implement these European obligations properly, Article 291(2) TFEU 
136. Art. 291(2) TFEU.
137. Craig, “The Role of the European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty” in Griller and 
Ziller (Eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? 
(Springer, 2008), p. 109.
138. Ibid., pp. 120–121: “It is therefore difﬁcult to see how the need for ‘uniform conditions 
for implementing legally binding acts’ justifying conferral of implementing powers on the Com-
mission would be of relevance in relation to such legislative acts themselves, given that they are 
directly applicable. … Where a legislative act is a regulation there is therefore no need for 
recourse to Article 291 in relation to implementation of that legislative act itself.”
139. Ibid., p. 121: “It would therefore be odd, to say the least, to enact a directive, but to 
empower the Commission to impose uniform conditions for implementation. The reality is that 
if the Commission’s power to impose uniform conditions for implementation were to be used in 
relation to directives it would radically alter their nature.” 
140. On the “morphological” limits of the instruments listed in Art. 288 TFEU generally, see 
Schütze, op. cit. supra note 38, 91. 
141. Art. 288(2) TFEU.
142. On the distinction between the concepts of “direct applicability” and “direct effect” in 
the context of regulations, see Schütze, op. cit. supra note 140, at 112–4. 
143. See only: Case 403/98, Azienda Agricola Monte Arcosa Srl, [2001] ECR I-103, paras. 
26 and 28. For a recent overview of non-directly effective provisions in regulations, see Král, 
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would henceforth entitle the Union to apply its centralized executive machin-
ery. However, in order to satisfy the instrumental format defined in Article 
288(2) TFEU, the Court ought to insist that the majority of a regulation’s 
provisions are directly effective. 
 The situation with regard to “directives” is slightly more complex. The 
Treaty seems indeed to “reserve” their implementation to the Member States. 
However, the Court has long ago clarified that where a State fails to implement 
a directive, the latter can have – vertical – direct effects within the national 
legal order. The self-executing provisions of a directive will nonetheless only 
be enforceable after the implementation period granted to the Member States 
has passed. Moreover, where its provisions are not sufficiently clear and pre-
cise, the latter can only become effective when clarified by national implement-
ing legislation.144 Article 291(2) TFEU appears to change this dramatically. On 
its face, it entitles the Union to adopt “implementing regulations” (or “imple-
menting decisions”) for a directive’s non-directly effective provisions.145 
If this is indeed the case, should there be constitutional limits to this power? 
Two such limits may indeed flow from the nature of the “directive” as a legal 
instrument. First, the Courts could decide that the centralized implementation 
of directives must remain the exception. To satisfy its instrumental format, a 
directive must leave the majority of its provisions to the implementation by 
“National normative implementation of EC Regulations: An exceptional or rather common mat-
ter?”, 33 EL Rev. (2008), 243.
144. A directive may also sometimes reserve a future decision to the Union. For example, 
Art. 2 of Directive 85/73 on the ﬁnancing of health inspections and controls of fresh meat and 
poultrymeat (O.J. 1985, L 32/14) provided: “The Council, acting by a qualiﬁed majority on a 
proposal from the Commission shall, before 1 January 1986, take a decision on the standard 
level or levels of the fees referred to in the ﬁrst two indents of Article 1 (1) and on the detailed 
rules and principles for the implementation of this Directive, and on possible exceptions.” This 
implementation was subsequently effected by Council Decision 88/408 on the levels of the fees 
to be charged for health inspections and controls of fresh meat pursuant to Directive 85/73/EEC 
(O.J. 1988, L 194/24).
145. A proposal in this direction has been made a long time ago, cf. Gaja, Hay and Rotunda, 
“Instruments for Legal Integration in the European Community – A Review” in Cappelletti, 
 Seccombe, Weiler, Integration through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience 
(Volume 1, Book 2: Methods, tools and institutions), pp. 113 at 134–135 “A directive could be 
accompanied by a regulation which may be designed to become applicable only with regard to 
the Member States which fail to implement the directive.” “In order that “action” be viewed as 
“necessary” under Article [308 EC], failure on the part of the Member States must have been 
previously established. This does not mean that a regulation could only be adopted after the 
deadline ﬁxed by the directive has expired; at that time the non-fulﬁlling Member State would 
probably make it difﬁcult for the Council to enact the regulation. Rather, this regulation could be 
issued at the same time as the directive, but clearly state that it becomes applicable only on con-
dition that some time after the deadline ﬁxed by the directive has passed and the Commission has 
ascertained – with a decision subject to review by the Court – that the directive as not been 
adequately implemented in one or more Member States.” 
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the Member States. Second, to comply with Article 288(3) TFEU, the Courts 
could insist that centralized implementation ought only be activated after the 
time limit for national implementation has passed. This temporal limitation 
would reinforce the subsidiary nature of the Union’s executive power under 
Article 291 TFEU. 
 Are there also morphological limits inherent in Union “decisions”? “A deci-
sion which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on 
them.”146 The wording of the provision is ambivalent as to a decision’s poten-
tial addressees. Constitutional practice has acknowledged decisions addressed 
to individuals as well as “State-addressed” decisions. But can a decision be 
addressed to national administrations?147 Put differently: may the Union 
“instruct” or “command” national executive officers directly; or, will the instru-
ment “decision” not allow the Union to penetrate the sovereignty veil of the 
Member States? 
 A number of provisions in secondary Union law superficially appear to 
address national administrative authorities directly.148 However, in the past, 
the Union judiciary has steered against this position. The Court thus held that 
where a decentralized execution of European rules is chosen the Member States 
are entitled autonomously to interpret these European rules, since “the Com-
mission has no power to take decisions on their interpretation but may only 
express an opinion which is not binding upon the national authorities”.149 
 Textual ambivalences in European legislation provide the national administra-
tions – not the European administration – with the power to decide on meaning 
146. Art. 288(4) TFEU. Constitutional practice has also developed “decisions” without 
addressee. On this point: see the brilliant analysis by Bast, Grundbegriffe der Handlungsformen 
der EU: entwickelt am Beschluss als praxisgenerierter Handlungsform des Unions- und Gemein-
schaftsrechts (Springer, 2006). Famous illustrations of a decision without addressee are the 
Comitology decisions.
147. For arguments in favour of this position, see Biaggini, op. cit. supra note 42, at pp. 109–
111.
148. Cf. Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communica-
tions networks and services (Framework Directive) (O.J. 2002, L 108/33). Art. 7(4) of the Direc-
tive seems to give “strong” control rights over national regulatory authorities. The Commission 
is granted the right to “take a decision requiring the national regulatory authority concerned to 
withdraw the draft measure” (emphasis added). A slightly less commanding tone can be found in 
Art. 22(2) of Regulation 1/2003 (cited supra note 80, emphasis added): “At the request of the 
Commission, the competition authorities of the Member States shall undertake the inspections 
which the Commission considers to be necessary under Article 20(1) or which it has ordered by 
decision pursuant to Article 20(4).” For a similar formulation, see also Art. 7(5) of Regulation 
(EC) No. 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in elec-
tricity (O.J. 2003, L 176/1): “the Commission may request that the regulatory authority or the 
Member State concerned amend or withdraw the decision to grant an exemption”. 
149. Case 133/79, Sucrimex SA and Westzucker GmbH v. Commission, [1980] ECR 1299, 
para 16. See also Case 74/69, Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen v. Waren-Import-Gesellschaft 
Krohn & Co., [1970] ECR 451, para 9. 
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of these provisions. This negative signal may indeed be seen as evidence of a 
general constitutional rule that prohibits the Commission from issuing formal 
commands to national executives: while materially targeted at national author-
ities, the formal addressee of a Commission decision thus always remains the 
Member State as such.150 It follows from this view that national administrative 
organs are not part of a hierarchically structured “integrated administration”.151 
There is no hierarchical subordination of national administrations under the 
Union administration. If a national  administration fails to execute European 
law, the Commission will have to initiate proceedings under Article 258 TFEU 
against a Member State.152 
4.3. “Mixed administration”: Institutional integration of Union and State 
administrations
As said above, federalism means duplex regimen. Applied to the executive 
function we will typically find two autonomous executive branches within 
federations. These two executives will normally be institutionally autonomous 
(American solution).153 However, a federal constitution may also allow for 
forms of co-administration, whereby the State administrations are subordinated 
and integrated into the federal administration (German solution).154 
 Traditionally, the European Union has been closer to the American solution. 
While the European legal order may insist on changes in the institutional or 
150. For an excellent analysis of this point, see Constantinesco, Das Recht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften (Nomos, 1977), p. 299; and more recently: Vogt, “Rechtsform der Entscheidung 
als Mittel abstrakt-genereller Steuerung” in Schmidt-Aßmann and Schöndorf-Haubold (Eds.), 
op. cit. supra note 1, p. 213, at pp. 219–220 and 227. For the opposite view, see von Danwitz, 
op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 626, whose empirical examples do not prove his point as they mention 
– with the exception of Directive 2002/21 (cited supra note 148) – the Member State, and not its 
administrative organs, as the formal addressee of the Commission decision.
151. On the conceptual relation between the power to issue administrative instructions and 
an integrated administration, see the brilliant analysis by Biaggini, op. cit. supra note 42, at 
p. 115: “Die instruierende Einzelweisung … trägt unverkennbar den Charakter der Mitentschei-
dung. Der Rahmen des delegierten Vollzugs wird gesprengt. Die Vollzugsstruktur nähert sich 
derjenigen des direkten Vollzugs an. Es entsteht ein verwaltungsmässiges ‘Kondominium’”. 
152. Kadelbach, “European administrative law and the law of a European administration” in 
Joerges and Dehousse (Eds.), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002), 
p. 167, at pp. 175–176: “If it comes to violations of EU law, the Commission, according to 
 Article 226 EC, will initiate infringement procedures by contacting the government of the state 
concerned which, in turn, will go though the internal administrative hierarchy in order to assess 
whether the complaint is considered well founded. Supervision by the Commission, as it was 
originally designed in the Treaties, thus largely follows the logic of state responsibility in public 
international law.” 
153. Cf. section 2.1. supra.
154. Cf. section 2.2. supra. 
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procedural architecture of national administrations, it has acknowledged a 
significant degree of national administrative autonomy. This administrative 
autonomy is protected by the constitutional inability of the Union to “com-
mandeer” national executive officers. Union commands are addressed to the 
Member States “in their collective capacity”. From this point of view, it is 
misleading to typify the relation between the European and the national admin-
istrations as an “integrated administration”.155 While connected in a number 
of formal and informal ways, the European and the national administrations 
do not generally form a “unitary administration” that is juxtaposed to executive 
federalism.156 The Union and State administrations generally constitute only 
“integrated administrations” – organizationally autonomous entities that coop-
erate in a federal relationship. However, in this final subsection we look at a 
number of legal phenomena in which the institutional cooperation between the 
Union executive and the national administrations has condensed to such an 
extent that they have to act jointly to enforce European law. Following the 
German terminology – and referring to European terminology in a different 
context157 – we shall refer to these special forms of cooperation as “mixed 
administration”.158
 Mixed administration represents an institutional expression of cooperative 
federalism as regards the executive function. What are potential instances of 
“mixed administration” within the European legal order? This depends on our 
155. Contra, Hofmann and Türk, “Conclusions: Europe’s integrated administration” in Hof-
mann and Türk (Eds.), EU Administrative Governance (Elgar, 2006), p 573, at p. 582: “The 
model of executive federalism is no longer applicable to the complex interactions between 
supranational and national administrative bodies in the enforcement of EU law, as it no longer 
adequately addresses administrative co-operation in a multi-level system of governance.” 
156. Contra, Chiti, “Decentralisation and integration into the Community administrations: 
A new perspective on European agencies”, (2004) ELJ, 402, who expressly identiﬁes “integrated 
administration” with “unitary administration” (ibid., 415–417). He conﬁrmed this position in 
later writings, see Chiti, “The Administrative Implementation of European Union law: a taxon-
omy and its implications” in Hofmann and Türk, op. cit. supra note 100, p. 9, at pp. 11 and 30: 
“[C]o-operation among national administrations and among national administrations and Euro-
pean authorities in the implementation of EU law has assumed such a quantitative and qualita-
tive challenge to be no longer captured within the traditional model of executive federalism”. 
“[O]ne should certainly conﬁrm that the notion of executive federalism has become inadequate 
to explain the overall features of the process of administrative implementation of European 
Union law”.
157. On the phenomenon of external “mixity” and mixed agreements in the EU legal order, 
see only: Hillion and Koutrakos (Eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and Its Member 
States in the World (Hart, 2010). 
158. Cf. Schmidt-Aßmann (op. cit. supra note104, at 4): “Mischverwaltung”. For alternative 
labels, see inter alia: Winter, op. cit. supra note 102, at 258: “Mehrebenenverwaltung”; Cassese, 
“European Administrative Proceedings”, 68 Law & Contemporary Problems (2004-05), 21, at 
22: “joint administration”; Ziller, Franchini and Chiti in Auby and Dutheil de la Rochère (Eds.), 
op. cit. supra note 2: “co-administration”.
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definition. The phenomenon of mixed administration has been defined as the 
“principle of ‘acting together’ [and] entails a complex sequence of [Union] 
and national determinations in a single administrative proceeding”.159 This 
restrictive definition allows us to exclude instances of administrative coop-
eration that are prior to an administrative determination. Thus, the (mutual) 
obligation to exchange information should not be seen as a manifestation of 
the idea of mixed administration.160 This form of cooperation takes place at 
the preparatory stage and simply improves the ability of either administration 
better to decide autonomously. The Commission’s ability to monitor national 
administrations should also not be seen as a form of mixed administration. 
Administrative supervision is not administrative determination. The European 
legal order indeed allows the Commission to monitor all national activities 
falling within the scope of the Treaties.161 
 What phenomena should be considered as expressions of administrative 
mixity? Mixed administration can be seen at work where the national and 
European administrations are cooperating in “mixed or composite proceedings”.162 
The latter will have two stages: a “national” and a “European” stage,163 in 
which both levels must make decisions that formally co-determine the final 
outcome. We find an illustration of procedural administrative mixity in the 
context of the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs.164 The relevant European Regulation 
combines a national authorization procedure with a European authorization 
procedure. The former is set out Article 5(4) of Regulation 510/2006: “Where 
159. Chiti, op. cit. supra note 34, 37, at 45 (emphasis added).
160. This form of administrative cooperation is as old as European integration itself, see 
only: Regulation 17/62 (cited supra note 74), Art. 10 (Liaison with the authorities of the Member 
States) and Art. 11 (Requests for information).
161. Cf. Art. 334 TFEU: “The Commission may, within the limits and under conditions laid 
down by the Council acting by a simple majority in accordance with the provisions of the Trea-
ties, collect any information and carry out any checks required for the performance of the tasks 
entrusted to it.” Where the Commission believes that a Member State (administration) has 
 violated the Treaties it will initiate proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU. On the various forms of 
administrative supervision in the EU legal order, see Rowe, “Administrative supervision of 
administrative action in the European Union” in Hofmann and Türk, op. cit. supra note 100, at 
p. 179.
162. Cassese, op. cit. supra note 158, at 24. see also Franchini, Amministrazione italiana e 
amministrazione comunitaria: La coamministrazione nei settori di interesse comunitario 
(Cedam, 1993), p. 174.
163. Depending on whether the European level precedes the national level or vice versa, one 
may distinguish between “top-down” and “bottom-up” proceedings, see della Cananea, “The 
European Union’s Mixed Administrative Proceedings”, 68 Law & Contemporary Problems 
(2004-05), 197, at 199 and 201.
164. Regulation 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of 
origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs (O.J. 2006, L 93/12).
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the registration application relates to a geographical area in a given Member 
State, the application shall be addressed to that Member State. The Member 
State shall scrutinize the application by appropriate means to check that it is 
justified and meets the conditions of this Regulation.”165 If the Member State 
considers that the requirements of the Regulation are not met, it rejects the 
application and adopts a national decision to that effect. By contrast, where it 
considers that the requirements are met, it must forward its favourable decision 
to the Commission for a final decision. This second stage of the mixed admin-
istrative procedure is set out in Article 6 of the Regulation: “The Commission 
shall scrutinize by appropriate means the application received pursuant to 
Article 5 to check it is justified and meets the conditions laid down in this 
Regulation”. Where this is not the case, the Commission will reject the appli-
cation.166 Where it believes the European rules are met, it will take a decision 
and grant the designation of origin.167 An authorization thus requires two pos-
itive executive determinations. Only where the national authority decides that 
the Regulation’s conditions are met will the European executive come into 
play. Both administrative levels may veto the application, and only the joint 
positive decision of the national and the European level will lead to a final 
authorization.168
 Beyond forms of joint administrative determinations, should we associate 
other phenomena with the concept of “mixed administration”?169 Should an 
organic dimension be added to the procedural aspect of co-administration dis-
cussed so far? And if so: what are the instances in which the European and the 
national administrations are united in an administrative organ that forms an 
“integrated administration”? Two phenomena have been discussed under the 
idea of “organic” mixed administration: comitology and agencies. The first 
165. The subsequent paragraphs then “commandeer” the Member State to structure its 
national administrative procedure in certain ways; e.g. para 5: “As part of the scrutiny referred 
to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 4, the Member State shall initiate a national objec-
tion procedure ensuring adequate publication of the application and providing for a reasonable 
period within which any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established or 
resident on its territory may lodge an objection to the application.” 
166. Ibid., Art. 6(2). 
167. Ibid., Art. 7(5). 
168. For a similarly “compound” administrative procedure, see (amended) Regulation 
258/97 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients (O.J. 1997, L 43/1), especially Art. 
4(2).
169. For example: the concepts of “additionality” and “co-ﬁnancing” within structural pro-
grammes could be identiﬁed with this phenomenon, cf. Regulation 1083/2006 laying down gen-
eral provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Reg. (EC) No. 1260/1999 (O.J. 2006, L 210/25), especially Art. 
15(1): “Contributions from the Structural Funds shall not replace public or equivalent structural 
expenditure by a Member State.”
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has been characterized as “a fundamental structure of integrated administration”.170 
In the past, this view was very problematic. While it may have been debatable 
whether comitology committees were formally Commission committees,171 
these committees do not directly co-determine the substantive European deci-
sion; they only decide which combination of European institutions decides.172 
However, the Lisbon Treaty may strengthen the view that sees comitology as 
a form of mixed administration. Article 291(3) TFEU now expressly refers to 
“mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of 
implementing powers”. And if the Commission’s vision of what this formula 
constitutionally requires were to succeed,173 comitology may come to represent 
the direct decisional input by the Member States into the Union administration. 
 Finally, what about European agencies? The rise of agencies in the European 
legal order has been phenomenal in the last two decades.174 While their deci-
sion-making powers continue to be trimmed by the Meroni doctrine,175 they 
have become important auxiliary organs in the direct administration of Euro-
pean law. Should agencies be seen as forms of mixed administration? The 
position has been voiced. European agencies have been viewed as “a joint 
170. Hofmann and Türk, op. cit. supra note 100, at p. 359: “Comitology is a fundamental 
structure of integrated administration.”
171. The constitutional nature of Comitology committees was discussed by the General 
Court in T-188/97, Rothmans v. Commission, [1999] ECR II-2463, where the Court held that 
these committees have their origin in Art. 202 EC and concluded “that, for the purposes of the 
Community rules on access to documents, `comitology’ committees come under the Commis-
sion itself.” (paras. 58–62). 
172. For recent literature on comitology, see Bergström, Comitology: Delegation of Powers 
in the European Union and the Committee System (OUP, 2005). The comitology system was 
reformed in 2006, cf. Council Decision 2006/512 amending Decision 1999/468 laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (O.J. 2006, L 
200/11). For an analysis of this reform, see Schusterschitz and Kotz, “The Comitology Reform 
of 2006: Increasing the Powers of the European Parliament without changing the Treaties”, 3 
EuConst (2007), 68.
173. For the Commission’s institutional view of the meaning of the control mechanisms 
required by Art. 291(3) TFEU, see the discussion above at supra note 64.
174. While a few agencies already emerged in the 1970s, there has been a phenomenal 
“agenciﬁcation” of the European legal order since the 1990s. Today, almost forty European 
Agencies exist in the most diverse areas of European law. For an inventory and functional typol-
ogy of European Agencies, see Griller and Orator, “Everything under control?: The ‘Way For-
ward’ for European Agencies in the Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine”, 35 EL Rev. (2010), 3 
– Appendix. On the rise and functions of European Agencies, see also Chiti, “The emergence of 
a Community administration: The case of European agencies”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 309 as well 
as “An important part of the EU’s institutional machinery: Features, problems and perspectives 
of European agencies”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 1395. 
175. Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SPA v. High Authority of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, [1958] ECR 133. On the “Meroni doctrine” in the European 
legal order, see Lenaerts, “Regulating the Regulatory Process: ‘Delegation of Powers’ in the 
European Community”, 18 EL Rev. (1993), 23 and Griller and Orator, op. cit. supra note 174. 
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organization, which is partly national and partly Community”.176 Where can 
we find such “mixed bodies”? One illustration could be seen in the “Trade 
Marks and Designs Registration Office of the European Union”. Despite its 
formal status,177 the latter shows elements of organic mixity in relation to the 
composition of its administrative board.178 However, even if one sees these 
types of agencies as a manifestation of mixed administration,179 the decisions 
they adopt will be fully assimilated to European law.
5. Conclusion 
The E(E)C Treaty – even after fifty years – was criticized for the “absence of 
a clear constitutional basis for public administration”.180 This absence was 
particularly marked in relation to the federal dimension. Who was to enforce 
European law: the Community or the Member States? In the original Rome 
Treaty very few legal bases expressly granted the Community the right to adopt 
individual decisions. The application and enforcement of European law in 
individual situations seemed to be left to the Member States. The latter were 
entitled and obliged “to take all appropriate measures, whether general or par-
ticular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of th[e] Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community”.181 The 
European Community thus appeared to be implicitly based on the German idea 
of executive federalism: the Community legislates European law and the 
Member States execute European law. Was the European Community thus 
bound to be a legislative giant on clay (executive) feet? Or, would the subse-
176. Chiti (2004), op. cit. supra note 156, at 434.
177. The “Trade Marks and Designs Registration Ofﬁce of the European Union” is formally 
deﬁned as a European body, cf. Regulation 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark (O.J. 2009, 
L 78/1). Its Art. 115(1) states: “The Ofﬁce shall be a body of the Community. It shall have legal 
personality.” According to Art. 116(1), the Staff Regulations of ofﬁcials of the European Com-
munities shall apply to staff of the ofﬁce. 
178. Ibid., Art. 127(1): “The Administrative Board shall be composed of one representative 
of each Member State and one representative of the Commission and their alternatives.” 
179. For another example, see Community Plant Variety Ofﬁce established by Regulation 
2100/94 on Community Plant Variety Rights (O.J. 1994, L 227/1). Art. 37(1) of the Regulation 
deals with the composition of the administrative Council. It states: “The Administrative Council 
shall be composed of one representative of each Member State and one representative of the 
Commission and their alternates.”
180. Chiti, op. cit. supra note 34, at 42; and continues (ibid., 57): “What is lacking in Com-
munity administrative law is a complex of original principles similar to those worked out for the 
‘constitutional’ dimension of the Community legal order, principles such as supremacy of Com-
munity law, direct effect”. “Thus, the task awaiting scholars is the creation of new principles 
appropriate to the administrative law of European integration.”
181. Art. 5(1) of the 1957 EEC Treaty.
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quent constitutional evolution of the Community reveal unknown executive 
reservoirs? What have the Lisbon amendments meant for the constitutional 
foundations of Europe’s executive powers? This article has tried to investigate 
these questions and thereby reached the following conclusions. 
 First, it is not true that “the EU has (with some specific exceptions) no 
original competence to implement EU law”.182 The E(E)C Treaty provided the 
European Community with two general executive competences: Articles 95 
and 308 EC. The two Articles could be employed where uniform conditions 
for the implementation of European law were necessary in the course of the 
internal market and a specific legal basis in the Treaty did not provide the 
power to adopt individual decisions. Moreover, both provisions were exten-
sively used in the past to establish the Community’s own executive infrastruc-
ture.183 As regards the scope of its executive competences, the European 
Community thus came close to the American solution. Nonetheless, the 
 constitutional foundations of European executive power were highly ambiva-
lent. The Lisbon Treaty now consolidates these foundations through the intro-
duction of Article 291 TFEU. The new provision clarifies that the primary 
responsibility for the implementation of European law lies with the Member 
States. However, it hastens to add that whenever uniform conditions for the 
implementation of European law are needed, implementing powers will be 
conferred on the Commission (or the Council). If Article 291(2) TFEU were 
seen as a legal basis, the Lisbon Treaty could represent a nocturnal revolution. 
The Article would replace ex-Articles 95 and 308 EC as executive competence 
reservoirs and would continue the transformation of the executive branch from 
decisional intergovernmentalism to decisional supranationalism. 
 Second, the European Union has created its own species of executive fed-
eralism. It follows American federalism in granting the Union executive com-
petences that are co-extensive with its legislative competences. But in 
generally leaving the execution of federal law to the Member States, the Euro-
pean Union follows German federalism. Behind this “European” brand stands 
the principle of subsidiarity: the Member States are in principle responsible 
for the execution of European law, while the European executive stands in the 
background. The EU will only interfere where the Member States fail to estab-
lish uniform conditions for the implementation of European law and where 
therefore implementation is “better achieved at Union level”.184 Importantly: 
the European Union has generally not chosen to subordinate and integrate 
national administrations into the European executive. Unlike German federal-
ism, the European Union is not constitutionally able to “commandeer” national 
182. Dann, op. cit. supra note 1. 
183. For literature on the rise of European Agencies, see supra note 174. 
184. Art. 5(3) TEU (Lisbon).
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authorities or their executive officers. It can only “commandeer” the Member 
States as States. This means that it is mistaken to speak of a “unitary admin-
istration” as opposed to “executive federalism”. 
 Third, European law has imposed a number of constitutional limits on the 
Member States’ executive powers. If entitled to act, the Union executive may 
pre-empt the national authorities or otherwise limit their substantive discretion 
by imposing mutual recognition duties. The Union has also limited the proce-
dural autonomy of national administrations. This is done either through the 
judicial principles of equivalence and effectiveness or through positive har-
monization. As regards the latter, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a new legal 
base: Article 197 TFEU. This is to be lauded in providing clearer constitutional 
foundation for “administrative cooperation” between the Union and the Mem-
ber States. However, in excluding the Union’s competence to harmonize 
national administrative law, the Article protects procedural autonomy over 
substantive autonomy. This choice may, ironically, actually reduce the material 
scope of decentralized execution of European law by the Member States.
 Fourth, the Union’s executive powers are subject to the principle of subsid-
iarity. The analysis of executive subsidiary is independent of an analysis of 
legislative subsidiarity: even when the Union is entitled to legislate, the 
 execution of the legislation may not be better achieved by the Union. We 
analysed a number of legislative mechanisms that presently define when exec-
utive action is better achieved at the European level. One of the most elaborate 
legislative definitions of executive subsidiarity can be found in the context of 
competition law. Here, the Commission has tied its decision to centralize exe-
cution under Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 to something akin to a sub-
sidiarity test. However, as we saw above, the test is very generous and provides 
the Commission with an extremely favourable executive prerogative over the 
national competition authorities. Have the European Courts thus insisted on a 
judicial review of executive subsidiarity? The answer, at the moment, must be 
in the negative. This is to be seriously regretted. Indeed, even if the Courts 
eventually rely on the idea of the “political safeguards of federalism” – now 
codified in Article 291(3) TFEU – the argument is not itself conclusive, and 
worse: it may not work within a special executive regime (like competition 
law).185 
 Fifth, the European and national administrations occasionally engage in 
forms of “mixed administration”. According to our restrictive definition, mixed 
administration exists where the Union and the Member States act jointly either 
procedurally or organizationally. The former could be seen in the context of 
the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agri-
185. Art. 291 TFEU constitutes a lex generalis that will give way to special regimes within 
the Treaty, such as Art. 105 TFEU (supra note 61). 
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cultural products. Here, only two positive determinations by the national and 
the European administration respectively will lead to an authorization. In this 
“compound” procedure, the agreement of both administrative levels is required. 
Are there also instances of organizational mixity? To answer this question, we 
first looked at the phenomenon of comitology and found that – at least until 
now – it may be misleading to consider it as a form of mixed administration. 
However, if the Commission is able to push its vision on Article 291(3) TFEU, 
the new “mechanisms for control by Member States” may indeed turn comitol-
ogy into a form of mixed administration. But in any event, we may already 
find examples of organic mixity in the composition of some European Agen-
cies. 
 In conclusion, European administrative law suffered from an impressive 
lack of clear constitutional foundations in the past. The Lisbon Treaty will 
remedy this to some extent. As regards the federal dimension, much depends 
on how Article 291 TFEU is interpreted in the future and this will – undoubt-
edly – be a constitutional task for the European Court of Justice. If the Court 
grasps the textual nettle, the Lisbon Treaty will consolidate the constitutional 
foundations of the Union’s own brand of executive federalism.
